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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on Kosovo’s bloody past and current 
socioeconomic developments that have led to the current Islamic radicalization of the 
country. Given that it is now one of the main contributors of foreign fighters to Islamic 
extremism, Kosovo is a perfect case study to analyze for a comprehensive understanding 
of how global violent Islamic extremism has gained such traction. Although many young 
Kosovars have joined violent Islamic extremist groups as fighters, there is a dearth of 
accurate data or information about why this phenomenon has arisen. As such, this 
research seeks to close the gap in literature by offering an analysis of Kosovo’s past and 
current political and socioeconomic climate and examining how the country became a 
hotbed of Islamic extremist recruitment efforts. This analysis includes a critical inquiry 
into the appeal of Islamic extremism in an effort to understand why its recruitment efforts 
have attained such success.   
In the last few years, Kosovo has become a fertile source for recruits by violent 
Islamic extremists in the Middle East. While such violent extremism has not yet left its 
mark on Kosovo’s soil, the recruitment, radicalization, and repatriation of those who have 
joined groups such as the Islamic State could increasingly threaten the internal security of 
Kosovo, with spillover effects throughout the Balkan region and beyond.   
One of the most pressing and serious threats facing Europe is the radicalization of 
European Muslims. Radicalized European Muslims travel to the Middle Eastern countries 
and the Islamic State’s territories, where they become further indoctrinated in Islamic 
 2 
extremism and receive training for terrorist activities for the purpose of launching attacks 
on European countries and beyond, and instilling fear across the continent. 
Given the imminent threat of terrorism and the potential disintegration of political 
and socioeconomic stability, European and American leaders have made countering 
violent Islamic extremism a priority. Kosovo is at the forefront of this policy. Secretary 
of State John Kerry visited Kosovo at the end of 2015, where he spoke of the threat posed 
by violent Islamic extremism and called international leaders to action, “I have just come 
from a meeting in Brussels with NATO where we have talked fully about the ways we all 
need to step up to do more to be able to destroy Daesh, and we are committed to doing so 
in the days ahead.”1 
Furthermore, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
held a Ministerial Council in 2015 and discussed this very issue. The assembly of world 
leaders, including Secretary Kerry, collectively recognized “Ministerial Declaration on 
Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to 
Terrorism” as the number one priority. In connection to this shared understanding, the 
Council produced the following statement: “Expressing particular concern that youth, 
including children, are being radicalized to terrorism and recruited as foreign terrorist 
fighters, and recognizing the importance of working with youth to prevent and counter 
radicalization of youth to terrorism.”2 
                                                 
1
 Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Kosovo, December 2, 2015, 
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/?page=2,9,5416. 
2
 OSCE Ministerial Council, “Ministerial Declaration on Preventing and Countering 
Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism,” December 4, 2015, 
http://www.osce.org/cio/208216?download=true. 
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Within the reality of terrorism threatening the safety and stability of numerous 
countries all over the world, what makes the case study of Kosovo, a country of 
approximately 1.8 million people, important or relevant at all? Kosovo’s importance in 
this counterterrorism discussion boils down to four major political factors: Kosovo is a 
seat of geopolitical significance in Europe; NATO fought its first war in a non-NATO 
state in Kosovo; Kosovo has been a continual point of political contention between the 
West and Russia; and lastly, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf have 
directed their religion-motivated efforts to Islamize Kosovo, a country that has generally 
been a secular state. 
In analyzing factors that contribute to Kosovo becoming a prime target of Islamic 
terrorist recruitment, this paper argues that the country’s socioeconomic environment 
explains why young Kosovars are such willing targets for the Islamic State’s ideology. 
This thesis argues that, while the Islamic State’s rhetoric of promising “that (fighters) will 
be granted direct entry into heaven,” which appeals to fundamentalist Islamic narratives, 
gives it religious legitimacy and motivation, it is the prospect of escaping social 
maladaptation and socioeconomic deprivation that constitute the foundation of the 
Islamic State’s recruiting success in Kosovo.3 
Since 2011, Kosovo has contributed approximately “125 foreign fighters for 
every one million citizens, making it the highest-ranking country among the 22 countries 
                                                 
3
 Shadi Hamid, “The Roots of the Islamic State’s Appeal,” The Atlantic, October 31, 
2014, accessed June 28, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-roots-of-the-islamic-states-
appeal/382175/ 
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listed” in a study by the Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS).4 This study 
surveyed countries with significant Muslim populations, such as France, Belgium, 
Germany, U.S., and Russia. According to the study, “the majority, or 54 percent, of the 
foreign fighters from Kosovo joined the conflict in Syria in 2013,” coinciding with the 
time when the Islamic State significantly increased its recruitment efforts.
5
   
 Since 2014, the Kosovo government has arrested over 100 suspects affiliated 
with terrorist activities, including Imams. Approximately 50 of these suspects are 
currently awaiting trials.
6
 While these numbers may not appear significant when 
compared with other countries with similar Islamic foreign fighter issues, they actually 
represent an extremely high percentage of involvement given Kosovo’s population of 
only about 1.8 million.  
The number of Kosovar Islamic foreign fighters leaving Kosovo is not the only 
reason for concern of terrorist influence in Kosovo. Abu Maqatil Al Kosovo, a Kosovar 
foreign fighter, who is considered to be in a leadership position within the Islamic State 
for Kosovar foreign fighters, released the following statement in 2015, calling for jihad in 
the Balkans: “I send a message to Taught of Kosovo, Macedonia, and all over the 
Balkans. Do not think that we have forgotten how you oppressed the Muslims. Dark days 
will come for you. You will be afraid to walk the streets. You will be afraid to work in 
                                                 
4
 Shpend Kursani, “Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo 
Citizens Involved as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Kosovar Center for Security 
Studies, April 2015, 7. http://www.qkss.org/en/Occasional-Papers/Report-inquiring-into-
the-causes-and-consequences-of-Kosovo-citizens-involvement-as-foreign-fighters-in-
Syria-and-Iraq-408  
5
 Ibid, 7. 
6
 Labinot Leposhtica, “Former Kosovar Jihadist Recounts Syrian Odyssey,” 
Balkaninsight, April 5, 2016, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/former-kosovar-
jihadist-recounts-his-syrian-odyssey-04-05-2016. 
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offices. You will be terrorized even in your homes.”7 If this call is answered—and it may 
very well be—then Kosovo will see Kosovars terrorizing their own people on Kosovo’s 
soil. But who are the violent Islamic extremists appealing to? How has the Islamic State 
achieved such success defined as recruiting in Kosovo? These questions will be answered 
in the following chapters. 
Indeed, what concerns Kosovo is not only that its young men are leaving the 
country to join in extremist groups, but also that these very same radicalized Kosovars 
would return to harm their homeland. The Government of Kosovo released its “Strategy 
on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalism Leading to Terrorism 2015–2020.” 
In this document was this statement, “The main risk Kosovo faces is the return of such 
fighters with radical beliefs and with an interest to harm Kosovo as a state with a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious society and with a secular government.”8   
Since the late 1970s, global violent Islamic extremism has increased significantly 
and its rise can be felt in many corners of the world. This thesis analyzes the causes and 
the key actors of global Islamic extremism and how it has affected Kosovo. Analyzing 
Kosovo through these lenses provides useful and comprehensive insight as to how 
Islamic extremism has become one of the greatest threats to global stability. For this 
analysis, this thesis is broken down into five major chapters, each focusing on a different 
                                                 
7
 Tim Ayres, “Islamic State Calls for Jihad in the Balkans,” News from Islam Exposed, 
June 10, 2015, http://islamexposedblog.blogspot.com/2015/06/islamic-state-calls-for-
jihad-in-balkans.html.  
8
 Office of the Prime Minister, Republic of Kosovo, "Strategy on Prevention of Violent 
Extremism and Radicalism Leading to Terrorism 2015–2020," Republic of Kosovo, 
September 2015, 5, Accessed October 1, 2015,  http://www.kryeministri-
ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGY_parandalim_-_ENG.pdf 
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component of the current violent Islamic extremism phenomenon, while using Kosovo as 
a case study for a broader understanding.  
Chapter One provides an in-depth analysis of the global rise of violent Islamic 
extremism, including a discussion of the difference between radical Islamic extremism 
and violent Islamic extremism. This chapter focuses on the key actors and contributors 
throughout history that have led to the rise of violent Islamic extremism. Included in this 
chapter is a discussion of the role of the Islam religion in extremism, the different sects 
within Islam, as well as the modern interpretation of Islam by powerful Arab countries 
who eagerly spread their interpretation of Islam. The chapter concludes with an overview 
of the challenges faced by Western countries in confronting and defeating violent Islamic 
extremism.  
Chapter Two discusses the emergence of Kosovo as a recruitment ground for 
Islamic extremism. This chapter begins with background information on Kosovo, 
including its origin, people, geography, relation to the West, religious makeup, and 
socioeconomic conditions. This presentation identifies factors that have driven Kosovars 
to become foreign fighters for violent Islamic extremists. This discussion also includes 
Kosovo’s experience with Islamic extremism and events that have taken place within 
Kosovo that have contributed to the issue at hand. Finally, the chapter discusses why 
modern Kosovo has become a breeding ground for Islamic extremism.  
Chapter Three discusses Kosovo’s challenges in confronting violent Islamic 
extremism. After presenting the main challenges in Kosovo’s counterterrorism efforts, 
the chapter proceeds to analyze how Kosovo’s bloody past has contributed to the risk of 
radicalization. That analysis is followed by an evaluation of measures taken by the 
 7 
government of Kosovo and of problematic areas in the government that may impede such 
efforts. Lastly, the chapter considers the international dimensions of Kosovo’s challenge 
in counterterrorism, including a brief discussion of the key countries that contributed 
significantly to the rise of Islamic radicalization in Kosovo. 
Chapter Four addresses the religious and socioeconomic components of Kosovo’s 
response to violent Islamic extremism. This chapter seeks to delineate both religious and 
secular factors in this complex situation and how they challenge Kosovo’s response to 
violent Islamic extremism. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a summary of thesis and 
recommendations for future research.  
  
 8 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE RISE OF VIOLENT ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
 
This chapter focuses on the emergence of global violent Islamic extremism and 
how it relates to Kosovo. In the following pages, the chapter traces the root causes of 
global violent Islamic extremism—to find a solution to any problem, it is best to first 
understand its origins. In order for this discussion to be fruitful, our understanding of the 
rise of Islamic extremism must encompass all the facets: its manifestation, root causes, 
key contributors, and religious and cultural influences. Violent Islamic extremism is a 
complex phenomenon and one deeply rooted in various factors. It is imperative to 
understand it in its entirety before any discussions about counter-terrorism—in Kosovo or 
elsewhere—can begin. 
 
How the Global Rise of Violent Extremism Gained Significant Traction  
The terminology used to describe the issue concerning this thesis varies from one 
continent to another and from one leader to another. Both “radical Islamic extremism” 
and “violent Islamic extremism” have been used to describe terrorist groups such as al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State. The general understanding is that when the term “violent” is 
used, it refers to violent actions, such as terrorist attacks. The term “radical” does not 
necessarily imply violence, but it is used to describe a form of extremism that could lead 
to violence.  
 Since the sole purpose of this thesis is to address the “violent” component of 
Islamic extremism, as it is the most dangerous aspect of this issue in Kosovo and 
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globally, “violent Islamic extremism” is used in this thesis to describe events in Kosovo 
and elsewhere that have been carried out in the name of Islam. 
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon; it has been present since the 
beginning of humankind. What distinguishes modern violent Islamic extremism from 
other forms of violence is an overwhelming hatred toward the entire Western world and 
all “non-Muslim believers.” This intense hatred leads to significant security threats that 
could crumble the stability of many nation states, making the present discussion of vital 
importance. More than just a political game, this type of extremism has instilled fear into 
every continent. In spite of extensive global efforts to weaken and destroy violent Islamic 
extremism in the last two decades, it is far from defeated. In fact, it could be 
characterized as the opposite of defeated.  
Evidently, the global war on terror since the attacks of September 11 has not 
proven to be very effective. Fourteen years since the attacks, President Obama’s 
“National Security Strategy 2015” ranked violent extremism and the evolving terrorist 
threat as a top security challenge.
9
 The 2015 Strategy also mentioned terrorist threats 
faced by other nations, which is very relevant to the Kosovo case study: “An array of 
terrorist threats has gained traction in areas of instability, limited opportunity, and broken 
governance.”10  
While many countries have joined forces in fighting terrorism, other countries 
have seen an increase in their citizens' participation in terrorism. Since the 1980s, some 
of the countries less robust economically struggle with high unemployment and low 
                                                 
9
 The White House, "National Security Strategy," The United States Government, 
February 2015, 1, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
10
 Ibid, 9. 
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education rates and have become a recruitment target for violent Islamic extremism 
groups. Recruits from these countries are willing to not only commit atrocities by killing 
massive numbers of innocent civilians but also kill themselves in the name of the Islam 
religion.  
The significant number of terrorist attacks in March 2016 alone—claiming 
hundreds of lives in Brussels, Istanbul, and elsewhere in Asia, the Middle East, and 
Africa—was a clear reminder of the strength and the threat of violent Islamic extremism. 
According to Middle East expert Fareed Zakaria, in 2014 alone about 30,000 people were 
killed in terror attacks worldwide.
11
 Zakaria further points out a crucial fact that is often 
overlooked: “the vast majority of those perpetrating the violence were Muslim but—and 
this is important—so were the victims.”12  
The Soufan Group recently released a report about Islamic foreign fighters who 
traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight in the name of Islam. The report, focusing on the 
Islamic State rather than all Islamic terrorist groups, made two important observations: 
“Nearly eighteen months later, despite sustained international effort to contain the Islamic 
State and stem the flow of militants traveling to Syria, the number of foreign fighters has 
more than doubled” and that “The motivation for people to join violent extremist groups 
in Syria and Iraq remains more personal than political.”1314 
                                                 
11
 Fareed Zakaria, “Why They Hate Us,” CNN.com, May 24, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/08/opinions/why-they-hate-us-zakaria/.  
12
 Ibid.  
13
 The Soufan Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign 
Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” December 2015, Accessed January 15, 2016, 4, 
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf, 
14
 Ibid, 7. 
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Modern violent Islamic extremism, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can 
be traced back to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
15
 However, the Islamic State 
has only gained international traction since 2011 as a result of the Syrian Civil War. 
Middle Eastern expert Ian Fisher from the New York Times noted, “[The Islamic State] 
traces its origins both to the terrorist training grounds of Osama bin Laden’s Afghanistan 
and to America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it achieved its resurgence through two 
single-minded means: control of territory and, by design, unspeakable cruelty.”16 
Notably, both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have ties in Kosovo, where both groups 
established their presence in the early 2000s.  
One of the most notorious terrorists known to humankind, Osama bin Laden, is a 
product of the Mujahideen, a foreign fighter from Saudi Arabia. Mujahideen is an Arabic 
word, which means, “One who strives or struggles on behalf of Islam.”17 Studies indicate 
that it was during the Mujahideen era (invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) when both the 
rise of Islamic terrorism and the Islamic foreign fighter phenomenon began. The creation 
of the Mujahideen is a result of both Soviet and U.S. foreign policies. While the United 
States and the Soviet Union were after their own political agendas and interests, a seed of 
Islamic terrorism was planted in a country that to this day has been in turmoil: 
Afghanistan. The Soviet agenda was to control Afghanistan, while the United States, with 
                                                 
15
 For the purpose of this thesis when the term “violent Islamic groups” is used, it refer 
specifically to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda as they are the two main groups connected 
to Kosovo. 
16
 Ian Fisher, "In Rise of ISIS, No Single Missed Key but Many Strands of Blame," The 
New York Times, June 18, 2015, accessed February 15, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/middleeast/in-rise-of-isis-no-single-missed-
key-but-many-strands-of-blame.html?_r=0.  
17
 Amy Zalman, “Mujahideen,” About.com, accessed July 08, 2016, 
http://terrorism.about.com/od/m/g/Mujahideen.htm  
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the help of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, armed and funded the Mujahideen movement in 
an effort to defeat the Soviet invasion. Raphael Veit, the author of “Afghanistan: Can we 
Fix it,” said, this conflict “revived the concept of jihad as Muslims fought against an 
outside invader, armed and trained under the patronage of the CIA—skills which would 
later be turned against the West.”18  
The Soviets were certainly defeated, but a new and perhaps more dangerous war 
began as the Middle Eastern countries welcomed ultra-conservative Saudi and other 
violent Islamic extremist ideologies. These ideologies became some of the root causes of 
today’s Islamic extremism. However, the political events that took place before, during, 
and after the invasion of Afghanistan only account for half of the problem of violent 
Islamic extremism. The other half is the Islamic component, which will be covered later 
in this paper.  
But what were the interests that compelled the United States and the Soviet Union 
to want to control Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries then and now? How 
has the Middle East run into such a disastrous fate? Akbar Ganji, an expert of the Middle 
Eastern, offers an explanation: the most important causes of what have turned the Middle 
East into flames are the “dictatorial regimes of the region, the West’s support for many of 
them out of interests in the vast oil reserve of the region and other strategic 
considerations, the economic inequality between the elite and the poor, and the 
occupation of the Palestinians’ land by Israel.”19 
                                                 
18
 Raphael Veit, “Afghanistan: Can We Fix It?” Australian Quarterly, Jan.–Feb., 2002, 
17. 
19
Akbar Ganji, "U.S.-Jihadist Relations (Part 1): Creating the Mujahedin in Afghanistan," 
The Huffington Post, July 2, 2014, accessed January 10, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/us-jihadist-relations_b_5542757.html.  
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To provide a better understanding, or perhaps a point of view, of how the creation 
of the Mujahedin has led to the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the following in front of Congress: 
 
We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. I mean, let’s 
remember here: The people we are fighting today we funded 20 years ago. And 
we did it because we were locked in this struggle with the Soviet Union. They 
invaded Afghanistan, and we did not want to see them control central Asia, and 
we went to work, and it was President Reagan, in partnership with the Congress, 
led by Democrats, who said, “you know what? Sounds like a pretty good deal! 
Let’s deal with the ISI and the Pakistani military, and let’s go recruit these 
Mujahedin! That’s great! Let’s get some to come from Saudi Arabia and other 
places, importing their Wahhabi brand of Islam, so that we can beat the Soviet 
Union!” And guess what? They retreated, they lost billions of dollars, and it led to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there’s a very strong argument, which is:  it 
wasn’t a bad investment to end the Soviet Union, but let’s be careful what we 
sow, because we still harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said, “OK, fine. You 
deal with the Stingers that we’ve left all over you country. You deal with the 
mines that are along the border. And by the way, we don’t want to have anything 
to do with you. In fact, we’re sanctioning you.” So we stopped dealing with 
Pakistani military, and with ISI, and we now are making up for a lot of lost time.
20
 
 
Clinton’s words offer only a partial summary of the United States involvement in 
the Middle East and its impact of poor foreign policy decisions since the late 1970s that 
are prevalent today. Undoubtedly, the United States has significant strategic interests in 
the Middle East, especially in Afghanistan, which must be achieved. However, a more 
effective and less damaging approach must be applied for successful results. 
 
The Role of Foreign Fighters  
There is certainly a profound connection between the creation of the Mujahedin 
and the global terrorism we are facing today. In fact, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20
 Ibid 
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the Islamic State, said the following in a video he released, addressing his supporters, 
“God gave your mujahedeen brothers victory after long years of jihad and patience…so 
they declared the caliphate and the caliph in charge.”21 Studies indicate that extremist 
groups use the history and achievements of the Mujahedeen movement as a marketing 
tool to recruit Muslim foreign fighters from all over the world to fight in the name of 
Islam.  
Thomas Hegghammer, author of The Rise of the Muslim Foreign Fighters, wrote 
that “since 1980 between 10,000 and 30,000 such fighters have inserted themselves into 
conflict from Bosnia in the west to the Philippines in the east.”22 Hegghammer 
emphasized that “foreign fighters are therefore key to understanding transitional Islamist 
militancy.”23 
According to a more recent report released by the Soufan Group, “between 27,000 
and 31, 000 people have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other 
violent extremist groups from at least 86 countries.”24 The Soufan Group also reports that 
“Tunisians, Saudis, and Jordanians continue to outnumber other national contingents, 
although a reverse flow to North Africa may alter the balance within the Arab group.”25  
Based on these statistics, the current influx of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq 
indicate that the Islamic State’s strategies for recruiting foreign fighters are by far the 
                                                 
21
 Hanna Strange, “Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims in 
Mosul," The Telegraph, Jul 05, 2014, accessed March 10, 
2016,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-
State-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html  
22
 Thomas Hegghammer, "The Rise of Muslin Foreign Fighters: Islam and the 
Globalization of Jihad,” International Security, Winter 2010/11, 53, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The_Rise_of_Muslim_Foreign_Fighters.pdf. 
23
 Ibid, 53, 
24
 The Soufan Group, 4. 
25
 Ibid, 6. 
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most successful in Islamic terrorism history. Foreign fighters are flocking to the Islamic 
State at unprecedented rates, although the Muslim foreign fighter phenomenon has been 
around for decades. Never before has a violent extremist group enjoyed such success in 
foreign recruits. Hegghammer also pointed out that a study of Muslim foreign fighters 
may have substantial value, because the number of Muslim war volunteers are 
significantly higher and “have affected many more conflicts than have foreign fighters of 
other ideological orientations.”26 
To date, many have proposed definitions of foreign fighters, but perhaps 
Hegghammer’s definition is one of the most fitting. He understands a foreign fighter as 
“an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency, (2) 
lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) lacks 
affiliation to an official military organizations, and (4) is unpaid.”27  
In addition to these features in Hegghammer’s definition, a Soufan Group report 
makes an interesting observation about foreign fighters: “The motivation for people to 
join violent extremist groups on Syria and Iraq remains more personal than political.”28 
This seems especially relevant to the foreign fighters from Kosovo and the Balkans.  
The foreign fighters themselves have also offered their own understanding of who 
a foreign fighter is, in a research conducted by Quantum Communications, 
“Understanding Jihadist.”29 Based on televised interviews of 49 fighters in Syria and Iraq, 
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the Quantum study sought to understand the foreign fighters’ experiences on the ground. 
Some of the fighters interviewed were active fighters, some were no longer active, and 
some of them were in confinement facilities. The access to fighters in confinement 
facilities was extremely useful as a comparison study against other fighters and against 
the Kosovo and the Balkans case study. The Quantum study will be referenced frequently 
in this thesis.   
The Quantum report identified nine types of fighters, with definitions provided by 
the foreign fighters of the Islamic State: 
1. Status Seekers: See the world that does not understand or appreciate them as 
they perceive themselves. They want to improve their social standing; their main 
drives are money, employment, and a certain recognition by others around them.  
 
2. Identity Seekers: Need the structure, rules, and perspective that come from 
belonging to a group, because belonging defines them, their role, their friends, 
and their interaction with society. They often feel like outsiders in their initial 
unfamiliar/unintelligent environment and seek to identify with another group. In 
this context, the “Islamic Ummah” provides a pre-packaged transnational identity.  
 
3. Revenge Seekers: Consider themselves to be a part of an oppressed group, and 
thus want to inflict harm on their oppressors and anyone who might support them 
(oppressors).  
 
4. Redemption Seekers: Perceive their engagement in Jihad enterprise as a 
vindication from sinful ways of living.  
 
5. Responsibility Seekers:  Values ties and want to preserve their family’s well-
being and prosperity by fulfilling the role of the provider/bread winner. 
  
6. Thrill Seekers: Are filled with energy and drive.  They want to prove their 
potential/power by accomplishing an arduous task or surviving a harrowing 
adventure. They are mostly in it for the opportunity to engage in action while 
enjoying a certain level of impunity for their acts.  
 
7. Ideology Seekers:  Are mainly in search of a certain world view that they can 
identify with and the “Islamic Ummah” provides a pre-packaged transnational 
ideology.  Unlike the identity with seekers who wish to “belong” to a social 
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group, the ideology seekers aim at “imposing” their world view on to the other 
group.  
 
8. Justice Seeker: Consider what is happening in the conflict areas as a major 
injustice and feel they have a certain inner calling to reverse this injustice. Unlike 
the revenge seekers, the justice seekers’ “raison d’etre” ceases to exit once the 
perceived injustice stops.  
 
9. Death Seekers: Have most probably suffered from a significant trauma/loss in 
their lives and consider death as the only way out with a reputation of martyr 
instead of someone who has committed suicide.
30
 
 
Besides the psychological factors that motivate some of the Islamic foreign 
fighters, the ideology of jihad is another significant factor influencing many of those 
foreign fighters. Jihad is a term that is often used in relation to violent Islamic extremism. 
Jihad is an Arabic word, which refers to the religious obligation of Muslims and the act 
of “striving, applying oneself, struggling, persevering.”31  
However, jihad is not always the primary mission for the foreign fighters. Robert 
Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago and the founder of the Chicago 
Project on Security and Terrorism, says that “religious fervor is not a motive onto itself. 
Rather it serves as a tool for recruitment and a potent means of getting people to 
overcome their fear of death and natural aversion to killing innocents.”32 This observation 
is consistent with a significant number of researchers who have studied Islamic terrorism. 
More specifically, Lydia Wilson, a research fellow at the Center of the Resolution of 
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Intractable Conflict at the University of Oxford, noted that “[the foreign fighters] are 
woefully ignorant about Islam and have difficulty answering questions about Sharia law, 
militant jihad and the caliphate.”33 This analysis is also very relevant to the foreign 
fighters of Kosovo, which will be further explored in the next chapter.  
In light of studies suggesting that Islamic foreign fighters, in general, lack basic 
understanding about the faith of Islam, where is the connection between Islam and violent 
Islamic extremism? An overwhelming amount of research has been conducted on this 
topic and generated various arguments, some supporting the notion that the Islam religion 
is to blame for the rise of violent Islamic extremism, others attributing blame to 
socioeconomic circumstances. The reality seems to be a mix somewhere in between, 
minimizing the religious component will not lead to successful defeat of violent Islamic 
extremism. Both religious and socioeconomic factors play a crucial role. 
 
The Islamic Component  
There is agreement that the Islamic foreign fighters who join groups such as the 
Islamic State and al-Qaeda are not generally strict practitioners of Islam. But there is 
certainly the religious component about the Islamic foreign fighter phenomenon that 
cannot be ignored or underestimated.  
Whether it is adherence to the Quran or the misinterpretation of it, the Islamic 
component seems to be directly linked to terrorism, as the violent Islamic extremists cite 
the text in support of and justification for committing atrocities, including the September 
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11 attacks. According to Charles Lister, author of Returning Foreign Fighters: 
Criminalization or Reintegration, “jihadists have also seized an interpretation of another 
hadith in which Prophet Muhammad predicted that three armies would emerge before the 
end of the world, from Greater Syria (or al-Sham), Yemen, and Iraq.”34 
It is evident that the Islamic State and other violent Islamic extremist groups use 
verses directly taken from the Quran to market, add legitimacy and justify their cause. 
The Quran provides ample support for anyone who is looking to use Islam as a reason to 
justify terrorist acts. Two of some of the most striking verses from the Quran are Q8-60, 
“to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others 
besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know”35 and Q9-29, “Fight those 
who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been 
forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if 
they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya (tax) with willing 
submission, and feel themselves subdued.”36 
Over the last two decades, the devastating atrocities inflicted across the world, 
including in Muslim societies, by Islamic terror groups such as al Qaeda are part of a 
bigger political goal, not only against the West. These terrorist activities have also been 
motivated by the Sunni–Shia rivalry within the Islamic states, which is believed to have 
contributed significantly to the current chaos in Muslim countries. Before this Sunni–Shia 
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rivalry emerged, however, an internal conflict within the Islamic countries has been 
plaguing them since “the death of the Prophet Muhammad, in the year 632.”37 
What has caused the word, Islam, to immediately resonate with terrorism or 
extremism? According to Fareed Zakaria, a Middle East Expert, “radical Islam is the 
product of the broken politics and stagnant economies of Muslim countries—they have 
found in radical religion an ideology that lets them rail against the modern world, an 
ideology that is now being exported to alienated young Muslims everywhere—in Europe, 
and even in some rare cases in the United States.”38 This Islamic terrorism era has 
inflicted an enormous amount of fear globally, and this global threat is no longer just a 
prejudiced concept. 
 
Wahhabism and the Sunni–Shia Component  
 According to The Sunni–Shia Divide, a report from the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Syrian conflict is a direct result the power struggle between the Sunni and 
Shia countries. “Syrian civil war that threatens to transform the map of the Middle East, 
spurred violence that is fracturing Iraq, and widened fissures in a number of tense Gulf 
countries.”39 However, violence and fracturing in Iraq was spurred by foreign invasion 
long before the Syrian conflict began. The report also points out to two specific countries, 
“two countries that compete for the leadership of Islam, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran 
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have used the sectarian divide to further their ambitions.”40 The Sunni-Shia divide is 
evident in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State is arguably a Sunni movement that “has 
placed anti-Shia sentiment at the center of its poisonous ideology” and indirectly 
supported by Sunni Arab powers.
41
 
Historically, the Sunni and Shia Muslims lived peacefully alongside each other 
for centuries until the Sunni-Shia power struggles of the last few centuries erupted. More 
specifically, the Sunni-Shia Divide report concludes that it was during Iran’s Revolution 
in 1979, “the transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic 
revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both 
countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam.”42 
Furthermore, Hegghammer says, “as late as 1950, Wahhabi clerics did not even consider 
non-Wahhabis as Muslims, much less as brothers in a united Muslim nation.”43 This 
rivalry between Sunni and Shia Muslims exacerbated since the Arab Spring in 2011. The 
Sunni-Shia tensions surrounding the Syrian crises provides further analysis of overall 
Middle Eastern instabilities. 
For example, Syrian President Bashar Assad, who belongs to the Shia sect, is 
fully supported by Iran, against a Sunni majority who oppose the president’s Shia 
Alawite sect, a minority branch of Shia.
44
 Approximately 73% of Syrians are Sunni, 15% 
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are Shia.
45
 It was not until 1970 that the Alawites in Syria, “an oppressed minority for the 
most of their history,” rose to power and “suddenly cemented their control in Syria in 
1970 when Assad’s father, Hafez, staged a coup that sidelined the Sunnis.”46 Assad’s 
father ruled Syria until his death in 2000. Immediately following his father’s death, Assad 
became Syria’s new president and has remained in power since. Assad’s presidency was 
guaranteed due to his father’s influence and dictatorship of the Syrian government, who   
“filled senior political and military posts with Alawites to reinforce his rule through 
sectarian loyalty.”47 In spite of President Assad’s heinous war crimes, including the use 
of chemical weapons against the Sunni majority population, he is heavily supported by 
Iran although adamantly opposed by the West and Saudi Arabia.
48
 After the use of 
chemical weapons in August of 2013 that left hundreds of people dead, which was 
strongly criticizes by the West, “President Assad agreed to the complete removal and 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal” to avoid U.S. intervention.49 
As Islamic terrorism captured the world’s attention by committing ruthless 
atrocities around the globe, the question of its fundamental cause arose. To suggest that 
the Islam religion is to take the full blame is entirely illogical, as it implies that all of the 
1.6 billion Muslims are terrorists. So how is Islam as a religion related to terrorism? 
Commenting on the connection between Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic 
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terrorism, Yousaf Butt, senior advisor to the British American Security Information 
Council and director at the Cultural Intelligence Institute, said:   
The horrific attacks on the Charlie Hebdo weekly in Paris have led to speculation 
as to whether the killers—the brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi—were lone 
wolves or tied to masterminds of the Islamic State or its rival, Al-Qaeda. No 
matter which organizational connections (if any) ultimately prove to be real, one 
thing is clear: the fountainhead of Islamic extremism that promotes and 
legitimizes such violence lies with the fanatical “Wahhabi” stain of Islam 
centered in Saudi Arabia. And if the world wants to tamp down and eliminate 
such violent extremism, it must confront this primary host and facilitator.
50
  
 
While Mr. Butt’s words may appear harsh, they are certainly not too far from the 
truth. 14 years since the war on terror campaign began, Islamic terrorism remains a top 
security threat to world stability. It is very unlikely that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State would still pose a significant threat without support from powerful 
Arab countries. According to Owen Jones, a columnist for The Guardian said, “ramped 
up rhetoric on security makes no sense so long as the West cosies up to dictatorships that 
support fundamentalism.”51    
The next contributing factor to Islamic terrorism is Wahhabism, which originated 
during the eighteenth century, and it is strictly and forcefully practiced in Sunni Saudi 
Arabia, which is also where most of the Islamic foreign fighters have come from. “About 
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2,500 Saudis” are believed to be in the Islamic State alone, and the number is 
significantly higher when considering other terrorist organizations.
52
  
The Wahhabi movement was founded by a Muslim scholar named Muhammad 
ibn Abd-al Wahhab, whose interpretation of Islam is slightly skewed according to many 
Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. “He encouraged his followers to interpret the holy 
books for themselves and to act on their interpretation in light of their own 
understanding, regardless of whether they understand the fundamental principles or lack 
thereof.”53  
 Saudi Arabia is well known for its ultra-conservative, forceful religious beliefs 
and practices as mandated by Sharia law, and its lack of basic human rights. For example, 
in 2014 Saudi Arabia sentenced liberal activist Raif Badawi to ten years in prison for 
creating a “liberal website that allegedly insulted Islam and religious authorities.”54 Mr. 
Raif Badawi is a case in point. It is difficult to fathom that in the twenty-first century 
people are not allowed to exercise freedom of speech, or to practice a religion of personal 
choice. Furthermore, Mr. Badawi’s attorney, Abu al-Khair, was also sentenced to 15 
years in prison, “in part for defending Raif Badawi.”55 The legal basis to sentence Mr. 
Badawi to ten years and his attorney to 15 years in prison for “liberal views” appears to 
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derive from laws put in place under Saudi King Abdullah.
56
 A Human Rights Watch 
reports that “Saudi Arabia’s new terrorism law and a series of related royal decrees create 
a legal framework that appears to criminalize virtually all dissident thought or expression 
as terrorism.”57 
These examples portray the cultural environment with Wahhabism in Saudi 
Arabia. These ultra-conservative laws are not necessarily important when addressing 
violent Islamic terrorism; however, it is a relevant concern due to Saudi Arabia’s 
profound influence within the Muslim world and beyond.  
Saudi Arabia has produced some of the most dangerous terrorists known to 
humankind, beginning with Osama bin Laden, including the vast majority of terrorists of 
September 11. Presently, among those in the Islamic State fighting in Syria and Iraq, 
violent Islamic extremists from Saudi Arabia continue to outnumber fighters from most 
other countries.  
Alastair Crooke, a former British military intelligence agent and author of 
Resistance: The Essence of Islamic Revolution, argues that Abd al-Wahhab, the founder 
of Wahhabism, and the Islamic State are the same in their religious and power views.  
Abd al, Wahhab demanded conformity – a conformity that was to be 
demonstrated in physical and tangible ways. He argues that all Muslims must 
individually pledge their allegiance to a single Muslim leader (a Caliph, if there 
were one). Those who would not conform to this view should be killed, their 
wives and daughters violated, and their possession confiscated, he wrote.  The list 
of apostates meriting death included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim 
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denominations, whom Abd al-Wahhab did not consider to be Muslim at all. There 
is nothing here that separates Wahhabism from ISIS.
58
 
 
Crooke makes another distinct point about the Saudis–Wahabism connection to 
the Islamic State, who both practice the Sunni sect of the Islam religion. “It appears—
even now—that Saudi Arabia’s ruling elite is divided. Some applaud that the Islamic 
State is fighting Shiite fire with the Sunni fire; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at 
the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony and they are drawn to 
Da’ish’s strict Salafist ideology.”59  
The purpose of focusing on the Islamic component, including Wahhabism and the 
Sunni-Shia divide, is to shed light on the root causes of the rise of global violent Islamic 
extremism. It is impossible to successfully combat violent Islamic extremism without 
understanding and addressing the Islamic component. It is highly unlikely that this 
phenomenon would be present to this extent if the Islamic religion were not a factor or 
used as a marketing tool. However, this does not imply that religion is the sole cause. 
 
Challenges Faced by Western Countries in Confronting and Defeating Violent 
Islamic Extremism 
The most significant challenge faced by Western countries in confronting this 
global phenomenon is the overwhelming increase of governance instability across the 
Middle East and in other parts of the world, such as Kosovo. One of the other challenges, 
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as noted by Combating Terrorism Center, is the lack of knowledge and focus on all 
aspects and complexities “that drive and help to sustain terrorism has contributed to a 
narrow view of tools or strategies available to combat this phenomenon.”60 Furthermore, 
the report makes another distinct point that “the United States has grossly under-
resourced the non-military aspects” of its counterterrorism efforts.61  
In addition, there has been a growing distrust fueled in the West against peaceful 
Muslims. These growing tensions within societies can potentially impede 
counterterrorism efforts as Muslims feel that they are not a welcomed part of western 
societies and less encouraged to report suspicious activities. This distrust hampers 
counterterrorism and widens the rift between peaceful Muslims and the rest of the 
society.
62
 
As it has been evident, countering violent Islamic terrorism is extremely 
challenging. One of the key challenges remains the radicalization and recruitment of 
foreign fighters. The foreign fighter phenomenon is truly global, with approximately 86 
countries seeing at least one of their citizens or residents travel to Syria to fight in an 
extremist group there, primarily for the Islamic State.
63
 Kosovo is a prime example of 
how violent Islamic extremism has been able to radicalize and recruit vulnerable men and 
women, which the next chapter will discuss in depth.  
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Summary 
This chapter gave an overview of the rise of global violent Islamic extremism, 
beginning with the history and the evolution of the Mujahideen movement during the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s. It was during this period that the 
cancerous seed of Islamic terrorism was planted that later gave birth to terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Furthermore, it was during the Afghanistan 
conflict when the Islamic foreign fighter phenomenon began, as Muslims from across the 
Muslim world flocked to fight in the name of Islam. This phenomenon has persisted to 
the present day and remains one of the greatest security concerns threatening global 
stability.  
The next chapter turns to the emergence of foreign fighters from Kosovo who 
fight in the name of Islam. As an extension of this chapter’s discussion on the rise of 
global violent Islamic extremism, Chapter Two helps to understand how Islamic 
terrorism reached the global stage by looking at its influence in Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EMERGENCE OF KOSOVO AS A RECRUITMENT GROUND FOR 
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
 
As this thesis concerns the radicalization of Kosovo citizens by Islamic 
extremism, this chapter is the linchpin of the entire study as it explains and analyzes how 
recruitment by Islamic extremism originated in Kosovo. This analysis entails both an 
examination of major historical events in Kosovo and an investigation into how weak 
states are exploited by violent Islamic extremism. To this end, this chapter focuses on two 
main themes: an overview of Kosovo as a nation state, including its history, origin, 
geography, religion, and current socioeconomic conditions; and Kosovo’s experience 
with Islamic extremism. The second part of the chapter includes a discussion of the key 
contributors, vulnerabilities, and timelines of the recruitment process. Lastly, the chapter 
considers the historically secular culture in Kosovo and the Balkans region, which makes 
Kosovo a unique case study among countries with similarly high numbers of Islamic 
foreign fighters.  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the highly complex nature of violent Islamic 
extremism and consequently the need to investigate various factors, including non-
religious ones, in order to fully understand its rising global influence. Kosovo is a perfect 
example of how political and socioeconomic factors can have a significant impact on 
cultural and religious dynamics, such as those resulting in participation in violent Islamic 
extremism.  
 30 
About Kosovo 
Kosovo is a landlocked country located in the western Balkans region in southeast 
Europe. Among its population of 1.823 million,
64
 92% are Kosovar, 4% are Kosovo 
Serbs, and 4% are of other minorities.
65
 Kosovo is surrounded by the Shar Mountains, the 
Kopaonik, and North Albanian Alps.
66
 The languages spoken are Albanian, Serbian, and 
Turkish. The three main religions are Islam 90%, Orthodox 7%, and Roman Catholic 
3%.
67
 
Kosovo and the entire Balkans region have a very complex and bloody history. It 
would be an incomplete assessment of Kosovo’s current events without briefly 
explaining the regional history and how that has contributed to the current influx of 
violent Islamic extremism in Kosovo and the entire region. 
 Kosovo was once part of Yugoslavia (also referred to as the Balkans
68
), which 
consisted of six countries and two autonomous regions. The six countries were Slovenia, 
with a Slavic and Catholic population; Bosnia and Herzegovina, a multiethnic country 
with Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox followers; Macedonia, also a multiethnic country 
with an Orthodox majority; Serbia, with a Slavic and Orthodox population; and 
Montenegro, a mostly Slavic Orthodox country. The two autonomous regions, which fell 
under Serbia, were Kosovo, a multiethnic region with a Muslim majority, and Vojvodina, 
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a Slavic Orthodox region. Although all these countries were often identified by their 
religion, Yugoslavia was a communist country during Tito’s rule from 1945 to 1980, and 
therefore the people and the culture were overwhelmingly secular. Most of the 
Yugoslavian population derived their identity from their ethnicity. Notwithstanding, the 
religious history of the Balkans region is important to this discussion and will be further 
discussed later in this paper. The map of the Balkans is included below. 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Balkans - Reproduced from “Huffington Post: Kosova ta   
eksportoj modelin ndërfetar” (lajm.net, 2015).  
 
  The oppression of Kosovars (also known as Albanians)
69
 in Kosovo began in 
1980, shortly after the death of the Yugoslav leader Tito, one of the most successful and 
effective leaders of his time. His ability to create unity and peace in a region where ethnic 
clashes had consistently plagued the population was remarkable. As John Stoessinger, an 
internationally recognized political analyst, explained Tito’s leadership, “his solution to 
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his country’s endless ethnic rivalries was simple: Loyalty to him was all that mattered.”70 
Following Tito's death, the dissolution of Yugoslavia began in the '80s.The system Tito 
had presided over since 1945 began to unravel.
71
 The clashes among ethnic groups in the 
Balkans became extremely problematic in the early '80s, leading to some of the bloodiest 
wars in Europe since World War II and eventually contributing to the conditions that 
would later give rise to a fertile ground for radicalization of violent Islamic extremism. 
During the '90s, the Balkans region encountered two episodes of major ethnic 
cleansing, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and in Kosovo (1998–1999), which 
led to a substantial death toll, expulsion of millions of people from their homes, and 
many other horrific acts of violence. It is important to note that among the Balkan states, 
Bosnia and Kosovo currently have the highest number of Islamic foreign fighters 
involved with the Islamic State, either by fighting in Syria and Iraq or involvement in 
local recruitment of foreign fighters.  
The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo during the '90s was organized by the Serbian 
leader Slobodan Milosevic. Approximately 11,000 Kosovars were murdered and about 
700,000  were expelled from their homes.
72
 By the end of the end of the war in 1999, 
approximately 90% of Kosovars were displaced. Stoessinger wrote, “The ethnic 
cleansing campaign against the Albanians (Kosovars) in Kosovo, which Milosevic 
planned after his military defeats, made the earlier campaign in Bosnia look like a dress 
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rehearsal for the main event in barbarism. The only thing that Milosevic did not copy 
from Hitler were the gas chambers of Auschwitz.”73  
These atrocities eventually led to NATO’s first war, Operation Allied Force, 
which became a topic of animated controversy in 1999 mostly because of NATO's 
military operations in a non-NATO state, Kosovo. However, NATO leaders and some 
members felt it morally imperative to intervene and stop the massive ethnic cleansing. 
The 77-day Operation Allied Force against the Serbian forces ended at the end of May 
1999. Immediately after the defeat of Serbian forces, the vast majority of Kosovo 
Albanians returned to Kosovo, although most of them had no homes to return to as they 
were burned down or otherwise destroyed during the conflict.  
In 1999, Kosovo was placed under the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission (UNMIK) mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1244, which allows the international community to operate in Kosovo. The UNSCR was 
created to assist in charting out and rebuilding Kosovo’s future. State Department Bureau 
of European and Eurasian reported, 
In April 2007, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari submitted to the UN Security 
Council his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the 
"Ahtisaari Plan"). The Ahtisaari Plan includes the main text with 15 articles that 
set forth its general principles, as well as 12 annexes that elaborate upon them. 
The Ahtisaari Plan is primarily focused on protecting the rights, identity and 
culture of Kosovo's non-Albanian communities, including establishing a 
framework for their active participation in public life. Special Envoy Ahtisaari 
also proposed that Kosovo becomes independent, subject to a period of 
international supervision. 
 
In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence in accordance with the 
Ahtisaari Plan and the newest country in Europe was born. The events leading up to 
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Kosovo's independence explain the presence of the international community in the 
country since the late 1990s through the present. The international community has 
remained in Kosovo not only to provide security, but also to support the Kosovar 
government with substantial monetary and professional assistance as Kosovo transitions 
into a sustainable, prosperous, and democratic country.  
However, wars that eventually gave birth to the Republic of Kosovo had left 
indelible marks on the country and its citizens. The repercussions of the ethnic conflicts 
are still felt today in Kosovo and have essentially led to the current surge of Islamic 
radicalization and violent extremism. The detrimental effects of Kosovo's war-torn 
history will be explored in detail later in this chapter.  
 
Kosovo and the Origin of Its People  
Albanians can be traced back to the Illyrians, an Indo-European tribe that 
inhabited the Balkans and other parts of the region during the first and second century 
AD. From the Illyrians was also derived the modern-day Albanian language. However, 
historical records of Albanians only date back to 1043, when “Albanian troops were 
reported as fighting alongside Greeks in the army of a rebel Byzantine general.”74 The 
Albanian language is an Indo-European language, “but exists in a sub-section of its 
own.”75 
The vast majority of today's Albanians live in Albania and Kosovo, with a 
minority living in Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. While all Albanians come from 
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the same ethnic group, they have different dialects and slightly different cultures 
depending on the country they live in, partly because of the different histories they 
experienced in the last centuries. For instance, Albania was part of the Warsaw Pact from 
1955 to 1961, whereas Kosovo was under the communist rule of Yugoslavia. Given the 
different geographical influences and historical experiences, the only thing in common 
between a Kosovar from Kosovo and an Albanian from Albania, both born in the 20th 
century, is the Albanian language and their ancestors. 
76
 
 
Religion in Kosovo 
From 1945 to the present, religion has been somewhat of a foreign concept for 
Kosovo and its Kosovar population. In fact, this was true for the vast majority in the 
Balkans as a result of the decades-long communist rule. The desire to fulfill some sort of 
Muslim duty, such as jihad, was nonexistent throughout the history of Kosovo, nor was 
the desire to gravitate toward Islamic countries or to lead a Wahhabi or Salafi lifestyle, 
until the beginning of 2000. "The secular legacy notwithstanding,” writes Monika 
Gabriella Bartoszewicz, "certain symptoms of Islamic awakening in the region invite us 
to investigate the change in the nature of the terrorist threat in Kosovo from the 
indigenous nationalist-separatist to a religiously motivated international terrorism."
77
 
Kosovo's historical secularism and the rise of Islamic radicalization alert us to the 
complexity of the Kosovo case study. While many would categorize present-day Kosovo 
as a predominantly Muslim country, the vast majority of Kosovars would say that they 
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are Muslims but do not practice the religion and never have. In fact, the average Kosovar 
Muslim would have minimal, if any, knowledge about Islam. Mrs. Bartoszewicz's 
account of interviews in Kosovo corroborates this: “We are Muslims, but we do not 
practice.”78 It is common to encounter people in Kosovo who are completely indifferent 
about religion.  
Tim Judah, Balkan Correspondent for the Economist, asks: "So, does religion 
matter? Whenever Albanians (Kosovars) address this issue it becomes a matter of pride, 
but also a cliché, to quote a line from a poem of Pashko Vasa, a 19
th
-century Catholic 
writer, who said that 'the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism.'"
79
 Judah's question is 
an observation that Kosovars from Kosovo and elsewhere have always fought for a 
national—not religious—cause. Kosovars derive their identity from their place of origin. 
It was during the centuries of Ottoman Empire rule in the Balkans between 1389 - 1912 
when people were forced to convert from Christianity to Islam, then 34 years later  “the 
Communist Party came to power in Yugoslavia at the end of World War II.”.80 81 
A fitting example demonstrating Tim Judah's observation is the Kosovo War in 
1999 and its most symbolic hero, Adem Jashari. Contrary to the common assumption that 
the war was religiously motivated, Adem Jashari and other Kosovars who fought against 
the Serbs did so for a national cause. Anna di Lellio and Stephanie Schwander-Sivers 
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wrote about the legacy of Adem Jashari and his entire family, who were killed during the 
war, pointing out that Jasharis are called and remembered as “deshmore te kombit” 
(martyrs of the nation). This is certainly not the same characterization as "Shahid" 
(Islamic martyr of jihad).
82
 
The Government of Kosovo also declared itself to be secular. The Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosovo, Article 8 (Secular State), reads: "The Republic of Kosovo is a 
secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs."
83
 The Government of Kosovo 
made this point very clear in 2011 when it banned Islamic headscarves (hijab) and 
religious instructions in public schools. On this legislation, Stephen Schwartz from the 
Weekly Standard reported, 
The August 29 vote rejected two amendments to the Kosovo Constitution on pre-
university education. Amendment 7 would have prohibited “discrimination 
against Muslims in school,” and was viewed as a measure favoring girls wearing 
the headscarf. It failed 43 to 39. Amendment 8 would have introduced religious 
education in the public schools, a proposition discussed in Kosovo since the end 
of the 1998-99 war. It was voted down 64 to18.
84
 
 
In fact, KCSS report says: "government officials along with the average citizen of 
Kosovo are unable to make clear distinctions between religionization efforts by religious 
authorities (i.e. Imams) and violent extremism efforts (other imams and extremist 
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activities)."
85
 Indeed, many Kosovars who joined the Islamic State had little knowledge 
of Islamic law and had never left Kosovo, according to a recent Pristina Insight article.
86
  
From these sources, it would appear that Kosovo is a predominantly secular state 
where people are not particularly enthusiastic about practicing one religion or another. 
But in this very same environment, there are now more long-bearded men and hijab-
donning women than ever before. As will be made clear in this thesis, this drastic change 
in religious attitude stemmed from the influence of world politics on poor and weak post-
conflict governance in Kosovo.  
 
Socioeconomic Conditions 
The average monthly wage in Kosovo is extremely low, “a measly $330 (290 
euros).”87 However, the cost of living in Kosovo is substantially lower than most 
countries. Kosovo is an extremely poor country, especially for European standards, “with 
per capita GDP estimates of close to 3,000 euros.”88 Kosovo also has an unemployment 
rate of 35%, with 60.2% unemployment rate among youth (aged 15 to 24 years), and a 
national poverty rate of 29.7%.
89
 The high unemployment rate and the extremely weak 
economy are a result of both the conflicts of the 1990s and a weak government along 
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with high corruption rates. Kosovo's economy has been heavily dependent on foreign aid 
and remittances from its Diaspora, the latter of which is believed to be Kosovo's strongest 
source of economic support.
90
 
Although Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, only 108 out of 
193 UN members have recognized its independence. A recent UNDP report states that 
“Kosovo’s non-membership in the UN remains a key obstacle to political integration and 
socio-economic development.”91 Two key UN members blocking Kosovo’s full 
recognition are Russia and China, party due to their political relationship to Serbia.  
In an effort to gain international recognition, Kosovo signed the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) in 2015, which is part of the integration process into the 
European Union (EU). Although Kosovo is now a candidate for EU membership, it has 
not made promising progress thus far. Lack of visa freedom from the EU isolates Kosovo 
from the west and most other countries, with the exception of its neighboring countries, 
Turkey and some Middle Eastern countries.  
Kosovo's struggle to strengthen its economy has other impediments. For example, 
the World Bank Group in Kosovo reported that Kosovo’s businesses and “companies are 
not compatible with their local, regional and international markets,” therefore “Kosovo's 
economic growth model is unsustainable over the long term.”92 The country's economic 
growth is also hindered by a lack of an effective rule of law. Moreover, Kosovo’s quality 
of education is lower compared to the international average, and access to good education 
is inequitable. As a result, young Kosovars do not get the necessary training to develop 
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skills for a rapidly changing labor market and international economy.
93
 There is also a 
lack of cultural and extracurricular engagements, especially for the youth of Kosovo, 
which stunts their development into otherwise competitive and competent workers. 
Kosovar government's apparent lack of attention to the education and development of the 
youth has left the younger generations underprepared for gainful employment and more 
tempted by “religious causes.”94 
All of these factors have fostered a socioeconomic environment in which young 
Kosovars are increasingly turning to Islamic extremism for an escape from poverty. Visar 
Duriqi, a Kosovo-based religious expert, observed, "Kosovo was economically 
devastated by the war and its economic recovery is still slow, which is creating many 
social problems."
95
 While the promise of wealth is not the main motivation that drove 
Islamic foreign fighters to travel from Kosovo to Iraq and Syria, it is certainly one of the 
motivations. For example a Kosovar police officer explained that a foreign fighter for the 
Islamic State earns “$2,000 as a commander,” which is significantly higher than the 
average monthly wage in Kosovo of $300.
96
 It is easy to understand how a person who is 
unable to find employment and who has a family to provide for would be drawn to 
becoming an Islamic foreign fighter in order to support his family. 
The statistics and facts provided above demonstrate that the citizens of Kosovo 
are extremely vulnerable socioeconomically. Lack of opportunities, lack of a strong 
educational system, and lack of the rule of law combine into the perfect recipe for 
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disasters. In Kosovo’s case, it has contributed to the current surge of radicalization of 
violent Islamic extremism.  
 
Kosovo’s Experience with Islamic Terrorism  
Carlota Gall, a reporter who covered Kosovo from 1999 to 2001, visited Kosovo 
15 years later and observed, "I had long followed violent Islamist movements, from 
Afghanistan to former Soviet Central Asia, the Caucasus and North Africa, but I was 
stunned to hear that Kosovo, which had long been a United Nations protectorate, had 
been infected, too."
97
 Gall also wrote,  
I wanted to answer the question in Kosovo: Who was behind this trend? Who was 
funding it, how, and Why? I went through hours of videos of radical preachers and ISIS 
propaganda, and read reams of U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks. Some 
detailed how rich donors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries supported the 
spread of fundamentalist teachings, and even terrorism, through charitable foundations.
98
 
 
Violent Islamic extremism and Islamic foreign fighters from Kosovo traveling to 
Syria and Iraq were unheard of prior to the summer of 2014, when a handful of arrests 
were made in connection with terrorism. A little more than a year later, in November of 
2015 the Kosovo government announced that an “estimated number of 300 Kosovars had 
traveled to either fight alongside jihadi groups or live in the Islamic State’s controlled 
territory.”99 Shortly after the release of numbers of foreign fighters from Kosovo, the 
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Kosovo government officials declared “state of alert on the grounds that Kosovo faced 
real risks associated with terrorism.”100 According to a reported compiled by Anita Rice 
from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, “regional security and intelligence 
experts have warned that despite crackdowns on radical Islamic extremists and other 
security measures, a significant number of young people from the Balkans continue to be 
radicalized online and the extent of extremism in the Balkans is likely much higher than 
originally thought.”101 
It is unclear how many of those who traveled to the conflict areas of Syria and 
Iraq have actually returned to Kosovo. Out of the 300 known foreign fighters, 50 are now 
awaiting trials in Kosovo for criminal charges in connection with terrorism. Based on the 
numbers provided by the Kosovo government officials, the country is, on a per capita 
basis, the highest-ranking source country of foreign fighters from the Balkans and 
Europe.
102
 
The KCSS reported that “the majority, or 54 percent, of foreign fighters from 
Kosovo joined the conflicts in Syria during 2013, when the Islamic State was 
consolidated.”103 During 2012, when Kosovo officials began to speak publicly against the 
mistreatment of Syrians by Assad’s regime, their vocal support of the opposition forces is 
believed to have encouraged some foreign fighters from Kosovo to join the Islamic 
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State.
104
 In 2012, the first Kosovo foreign fighter, Naman Demolli, was killed in Syria 
while fighting alongside the opposition against the Assad regime.
105
 
In the summer of 2015, Kosovo police detained five supporters of the Islamic 
State who were suspected of planning to poison Pristina’s main water supply.106 It is 
believed that they began the plot after the Islamic State released a video calling on 
“sympathizers throughout the Balkans to mark the holy month of Ramadan by killing and 
poisoning unbelievers.”107 
The Islamic State's influences have reached the women of Kosovo as well. A 
police report indicates that, to date, 36 women have traveled to Syria and Iraq.
108
 Kosovar 
women's participation in Islamic extremism is a topic extensively written about by 
Arbana Xharra, a prominent Kosovo journalist. She recently interviewed a Kosovar man 
who is the father-in-law of a young Kosovar woman foreign fighter, Laura Hyseni. The 
man said, “In just a couple of months, the village imam and his wife brainwashed 
them.”109 He was referring to his son and daughter-in-law, who traveled together to the 
Middle East as foreign fighters.  
                                                 
104
 Louis Charbonneau, "Kosovo Voices Strong Support for Syrian Opposition,” Reuters, 
May 14, 2012, accessed March 1, 2016, accessed March 1, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-kosovo-idUSBRE84D1EI20120514.  
105
 Studio Islame Prishtina (2012). “Kosovari Naman Demolli eshte vrare ne Siri 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NaD-hopf1_s  
106
 Una Hajdari and Sinisa Jakov-Marusic, "Kosovo Foils Terror Plot to Poison Water 
Supply," BalkanInsight, July 13, 2015, accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/five-kosovars-detained-for-planning-terrorist-
attack  
107
 Ibid.  
108
 Arbana Xharra, "Few but Fanatical–The Kosovo Women Who Go Over to ISIS," 
BalkanInsight, January 26, 2016, accessed January 27, 
2016,http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/few-but-fanatical-the-kosovo-women-
who-go-over-to-isis-01-22-2016.   
109
 Ibid. 
 44 
Most recently, a Yahoo News article reported that three years ago, Albert and 
Yassin left their homes in Kosovo and Albania to wage jihad in Syria. Now they’re back, 
leading the jihadists in a region the Islamic State has called a “new front” in Europe.110 
The return of Kosovar Islamic foreign fighters who intend on launching attacks on their 
homeland poses the most serious threat to Kosovo and the continent of Europe. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, a video released by the Islamic State in 2015 threatened the 
Balkan region with these words: “Black days are coming to you.” These threats could 
easily become real attacks with the involvement of Kosovar fighters who have 
repatriated, especially given recent government estimates that approximately 120 
Kosovar foreign fighters have returned from Syria and Iraq.  
Another factor in the surge of radicalization of Kosovo is the country's changing 
relationship with the West. Kosovars generally had a favorable impression of the United 
States and the UK, since the United States led the NATO intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict. Some streets in Kosovo are named after former U.S. President Bill Clinton and 
former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the younger generations, such as those 
under the age of 15, do not remember or did not experience the conflict of the 1990s, and 
they have less reason to support or trust the West. With recent corruption scandals 
affecting the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) as well as allegations 
of illicit dealings of former American Ambassador Christopher Dell, the perception of the 
West has declined among the younger Kosovars, especially among those who view the 
West as the puppeteer of the failing Kosovo government.
111
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A recent UNDP report indicates that close to 70% of Kosovars are dissatisfied 
with Kosovo’s political orientation.113 As the younger generation grows up without jobs 
or opportunities, knowing only corruption and politicians who are directed by the United 
States, they are more increasingly likely to assign the blame to the West for Kosovo's 
failing institutions and policies. 
 
Why Modern Kosovo is a Breeding Ground for Islamic Extremism 
       Although Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia eight years ago, there have 
been tremendous challenges for the citizens of Kosovo, including large youth population, 
high unemployment rate, high corruption, weak education system, strong ethnic divides, 
high levels of nationalism and strong ethnic ties. A 2016 UNDP report found that "more 
than three quarters of Kosovans (78%) think that the largest problems facing Kosovo 
today are related to the country’s socioeconomic conditions. Indeed, respondents selected 
unemployment (57.1%), poverty (21.4%), and corruption (5.6%) as the three biggest 
issues, which impact their social well-being."
114
 
    All of these factors have contributed significantly to Islamic radicalization. For 
example, if young Kosovar men cannot find jobs—whether as a result of inadequate 
education, corruption or a weak rule of law—they will not be able to get married and start 
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a family; as single, able-bodied young men, they become easy targets for Islamic 
radicalization. Traditional values such as marriage, children and family life are critical to 
identity of young people.  
 Furthermore, Kosovo citizens do not have freedom of movement. For some, the 
only way to improve their livelihood is to join violent Islamic extremist groups. 
Additionally, for those who are suffering in a society fraught with problems and 
suffering, the rhetoric of extremist groups about the world needing a paradigm shift or 
new regime is extremely appealing.   
 
Summary  
This chapter follows an overview of global violent Islamic extremism in Chapter 
One and discusses the complexity of violent Islamic extremism by examining its 
influence in Kosovo. This chapter began by describing Kosovo's historical and cultural 
background, including the ethnic conflicts in the 1990s that became the context for the 
surge of Islamic radicalization. This analysis helps identify the factors that have helped 
Islamic extremism gain traction and succeed in securing recruits from all over the world.  
The next chapter turns to Kosovo’s challenges in confronting violent Islamic 
extremism. Chapter Three will begin with a detailed explanation of how Kosovo’s bloody 
past has contributed to Islamic radicalization. The chapter then considers the measures 
the Kosovo government has taken to counter terrorism, and evaluates the problems with 
those measures and the government itself. This analysis includes a discussion of the 
impact of international dimensions will be discussed in great length. By exploring the 
difficulties that Kosovo wrestles with in its fight against terrorism, Chapter Four presents 
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another dimension of radicalization in Kosovo in support of the overall narrative of this 
thesis 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KOSOVO’S CHALLENGES IN CONFRONTING VIOLENT ISLAMIC 
EXTREMISM 
 
Having presented an overview of Kosovo’s past and present situations, as well as 
its involvement with global violent Islamic extremism, this chapter turns to the 
challenges Kosovo faces in its fight against Islamic extremism, including challenges in 
security policies, border security, and policy structure. This chapter also addresses a 
much more complex issue that has only received attention recently—the international 
dimensions of Kosovo’s challenge in dealing with violent Islamic extremism.  
 
Main Challenges in Kosovo’s Response to Violent Islamic Extremism 
Kosovo has more than just a few challenges in combating violent Islamic 
extremism—its status as the newest country in Europe brings a host of problems, from 
domestic instability to vulnerabilities to foreign threats, all adding to the complexity of its 
counterterrorism efforts. As detailed in Chapter Three, Kosovo’s landscape was forever 
changed during the conflicts of the 1990s, especially in 1999 when Kosovars were either 
killed or expelled from Kosovo by Serbian military forces.  
In May 1999, NATO’s intervention ended the Kosovo conflict, by which time 
approximately 90% or more of the remaining Kosovar population was scattered around 
the globe. They began to return to Kosovo, but only to find their homes burned to the 
ground. Homeless, grieving the death of family members, and left without livelihoods as 
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many of their businesses were destroyed, Kosovars faced the seemingly insurmountable 
challenge of rebuilding their country.
115
  
To describe Kosovo as a new country would be an understatement. Not only did 
Kosovo have to develop itself from the ground up in every aspect—from the economy, 
laws, and law enforcement, to education and security—it also had to accomplish this as 
people were grieving and as resources were desperately scarce. The country lacked in 
human and physical resources, expertise, and the knowledge to rebuild itself. All of these 
factors together formed an unstable, volatile, and harsh environment in which the 
radicalization of violent Islamic extremism could gain traction. Violent Islamic 
extremism is now considered to be the biggest security threat facing Kosovo, its region, 
NATO, and the UN mission in Kosovo. It certainly threatens the United States’ “goal to 
help Kosovo become a stable, democratic, and economically viable country within 
Europe.”116 
Violent Islamic extremism in Kosovo threatens more than just Kosovo and its 
citizens; it is a threat to the international body. To strengthen Kosovo and enable it to 
stabilize and combat violent Islamic extremism, the international community—including 
the United States, EU, UN, NATO, OSCE, and other international entities—has invested 
years and millions of dollars in the development of Kosovo in the last 17 years. The 
United States alone has “contributed almost $2 Billion to Kosovo’s development” since 
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the conflict of 1999.
117
 This figure does not include more recent contributions. However, 
even with such international support, Kosovo still faces substantial challenges in 
confronting violent Islamic extremism.  
 
How Kosovo’s Bloody Past in the 1990s Contributed to the Risk of Radicalization 
 One of the factors that motivated foreign fighters from Kosovo appears to be an 
emotional connection to those who were affected by the atrocities that took place in Syria 
around 2012. A United Nations Development Program report concerning Kosovo 
concluded that most of the Kosovar “Jihadis were deeply moved by the suffering of the 
Syrian people under the al-Assad regime, whose crimes echoed those committed in 
Kosovo in the 1990s.”118 A former Kosovar foreign fighter to Syria, Albert Berisha, who 
has been charged with terrorism-related crimes, said he took an “emotional decision” to 
leave for the Middle East “after seeing on TV and social media what was happening in 
Syria.”119 Berisha also said that “he traveled to Syria to help the moderate Syrian 
opposition but got trapped by the Islamic State fighters.”120  
 Additionally, for someone who lives in Kosovo without freedom of movement, 
employment, or opportunities to improve the quality of life, joining violent Islamic 
groups is one of the only opportunities they have to escape poverty and find the meaning 
of life. While for most logical people this would not be an option, it may seem perfectly 
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viable for those who struggle to make a living in Kosovo’s struggling economy. Visar 
Duriqi, a Kosovo-based expert in religion said, “Kosovo was economically devastated 
during the war and its economic recovery is still slow, which is creating many social 
problems.”121 The socioeconomic vulnerabilities in Kosovo have compelled some of its 
population toward Islamic terrorism groups or organizations for economic liberation.
122
 
Unfortunately, these socioeconomic challenges are unlikely to be resolved in the near 
future, as the solutions to these challenges necessitate systemic reforms on the 
governmental and social level.  
 
Measures Taken by the Government of Kosovo 
  The issue of violent Islamic extremism or Islamic foreign fighters from Kosovo 
was almost unheard of until 2012, when it was reported that Naman Demolli, a Kosovar, 
was killed in Syria while supporting the opposition party.
123
 Even then, it was not clear 
what this meant for the Kosovo citizens or who Naman Demolli was fighting for. A 
KCSS report said, “citizens and the relevant institutions in Kosovo did not have a clear 
picture on how the opposition against Assad was organized.
124
 At this time, combating 
terrorism was understandably not on the government’s list of priorities. 
 However, Kosovo officials soon realized the threat of violent Islamic extremism 
to their country. Data indicates between 2012 and 2014, the Kosovo government began to 
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notice and address the surge in the number of Islamic foreign fighters from Kosovo. As 
was previously discussed, the KCSS report indicated that the majority of the Kosovo 
foreign fighters joined the Islamic State and other terrorist groups during 2013.
125
 During 
the same period of time, in 2012, when the Syrian conflict began to receive attention, 
Kosovo’s Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj publicly voiced support for Syria’s opposition 
party and claimed that the Kosovo’s government “had already established diplomatic 
contacts with Syrians fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad.”126 This public support 
of the opposition party might have prompted some Kosovars to join in the Syrian 
conflict. However, a KCSS report indicates that even before it was public knowledge in 
Kosovo that violent Islamic extremist groups were fighting in the Syrian conflict, “a 
number of citizens from Kosovo had already joined some opposition forces, including the 
then unknown Al Qaeda affiliated faction that emerged during 2012.”127 Regardless of 
the timeline, it is clear that the issue of Kosovar Islamic foreign fighter phenomenon is a 
fairly new topic for the Kosovo government. While the government has taken many 
measures to combat violent Islamic extremism, significant challenges remain.  
  A recent State Department Country Report on Terrorism indicated that although 
“Kosovo demonstrated political will to address threats related to terrorism, and the state 
possesses the legal framework to do so,” the problem remains in its “national 
institutions—including investigative and prosecutorial elements have limited capacity, 
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resources, and experience to handle terrorism cases effectively.”128 These issues, which 
hinder Kosovo’s efforts in combating violent Islamic extremism, will be given an in-
depth analysis later this chapter. 
  Despite the difficulties of countering terrorism, the Kosovo government has 
indeed demonstrated willingness to tackle the issue. The most significant measure it has 
taken in this regard was an antiterrorism operation in August 2014. The Wall Street 
Journal reported that “Kosovo launched a major operation against suspected domestic 
militants who have fought in Syria and Iraq, arresting at least 40 people and seizing 
weapons and explosives in dozens of locations.”129 Additionally, only a month later, in 
September of 2014, the Kosovo government launched the second biggest operation, 
arresting 15 people suspected of links to terrorism.
130
 Fatos Bytyqi of Reuters reported 
that at least nine imams were among the 15 people arrested, as the government attempts 
to stem the flow of young ethnic Albanians joining Islamist fighters in Iraq and Syria.
131
 
A Kosovo police official involved in the second operation said, “the majority of those 
arrested are imams of different mosques belonging to the Islamic Community of 
Kosovo.”132  
  By the beginning of 2015, more than 80 arrests were made in Kosovo related to 
terrorist charges. However, more than 60 percent of them were either released or placed 
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on house arrest.
133
 As of the writing of this thesis, in June 2016, trials are still underway 
of individuals charged in as early as 2013 and 2014. The government made more arrests 
throughout 2015, opening 20 new cases related to terrorism.
134
 One of the arrests 
apprehended five individuals who attempted to poison Lake Badovc, the main water 
supply of the capital Pristina.
135
 It was later revealed that two of these five had returned 
to Kosovo from fighting in Syria alongside the Islamic State.
136
  
  In 2016 the government continues to arrest terrorist suspects, and it apprehended 
two Islamic foreign fighters who are believed to have left Pristina in November 2013 to 
go to Istanbul, Turkey, then crossed over to Syria, where they were trained and armed by 
Islamic terrorist groups.
137
 The most significant counterterrorism-related operation of 
2016, which was highly publicized, was the trial of Zekerija Qazim, a “hard-line imam” 
from Kosovo. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, the most severe sentence issued to 
date on terrorism charges in Kosovo. In total, the Kosovo government has sentenced 
seven individuals to a total of forty-two years of imprisonment.
138
 Imam Zekerija Qazimi 
was found guilty of recruiting individuals from Kosovo to travel to Syria and fight 
alongside the Islamic State. “He was also accused of making jihad the main subject in 
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many of his sermons.”139 In fact, in 2013 Imam Qazimi was featured in a YouTube video 
in which he declared, “the blood of infidels is the best drink for us.”140  
  Six other individuals who were sentenced on the same day as Imam Qazimi, five 
of whom were found guilty on charges related to joining the Islamic State in Syria.
141
 The 
seventh individual was found guilty and imprisoned on charges of recruiting Islamic 
foreign fighters.
142
 Kosovo passed a law in April 2015 that expressly prohibits its citizens 
from joining any foreign conflicts, with a penalty of up to fifteen years of 
imprisonment.
143
 It is unclear whether it was under this law that these six individuals 
were sentenced.  
  In addition to the 2015 law, the Kosovo government also passed an anti-terror 
funding and money laundering law.
144
 Kosovo also signed an extradition treaty with the 
United States in March 2016. The United States Ambassador to Kosovo, Greg Delawie, 
indicated that “the ability to extradite criminals between our two countries will be an 
important tool in the struggle against terrorism and against transnational crime.”145 
According to BalkanInsight, the extradition treaty followed an incident in 2010 involving 
a Kosovar in the United States who was suspected to have been “providing material and 
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support to terrorism.”146 
While there is ample evidence of the Kosovo government’s active efforts in 
combating terrorism, such efforts are hampered by Kosovo’s operational experience, 
capabilities, and overall law enforcement structure. The State Department report 
indicated that Kosovo “authorities were inexperienced in dealing with terrorism cases, 
and communications and information sharing across agencies remained a challenge.”147 
The report continues to note that “Kosovo’s legislative framework is sufficient, but 
prosecutors lack experience in trying [terrorism-related] cases.”148 
Kosovo officials’ inexperience with combating violent Islamic extremism has 
been a known issue. For example, a recent BalkanInsight article reported that two 
Kosovars were convicted on terrorism-related charges, but the terrorist group 
“Harausham” that they were accused of joining “may only exist in the prosecution’s 
indictment and other related court documents.”149 Each of the accused individuals 
received about three and a half years in prison, but the “documents compiled by Chief 
Special Prosecutor Reshat Millaku (who oversaw this particular case) contains no 
evidence of ‘Harausham’s’ existence,” nor does it indicate that it has ties to any other 
terrorist group.
150
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The Kosovo government’s inexperience with counterterrorism affects not only its 
prosecution of terrorist suspects, but also in implementing other necessary policies. The 
government approved a national Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy in 
September 2015 and established an inter-ministerial CVE working group.
151
 The CVE 
strategy provides a five-year comprehensive guideline on preventing and decreasing the 
threat of violent Islamic terrorism in Kosovo. These measures, while well-intended, are 
unlikely to be effective in the short-run, because the implementation of the strategy 
requires resources and funding that Kosovo simply does not have at this time.  
Although Kosovo may seem to be in a precarious position in its fight against 
violent Islamic terrorism, the Kosovo government is not without support. A robust 
network of international bodies has been providing various forms of support to Kosovo, 
including funding, training of law enforcement, border control, and judicial authorities, as 
well as other programs to assist Kosovo in its efforts. Some of the most significant 
contributors to Kosovo’s counterterrorism initiatives are the United States (through its 
Justice Department, State Department, Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), 
International Criminal Investigative Training Program (ICITAP), Export Control and 
Related Border Security (EXBS)), the OSCE, and the UN Office of Antiterrorism.
152
 
While the Kosovo government’s counterterrorist measures thus far may not seem 
effective, it is undeniable that Kosovo has, in cooperation with the international 
community, strengthened and advanced its legislative, law enforcement, and border 
control structures in response to violent Islamic terrorism. The international community 
continues to support Kosovo as its government endeavors to combat terrorism. An 
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example of such international support is the invitation extended to Kosovo officials to the 
White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in New York in February 2015. 
Kosovo has also been selected to become a part of the Global Community Engagement 
and Resilience Fund (GCERF), which will provide Kosovo monetary funds to combat 
violent Islamic Extremism.
153
 
 
Problematic Areas in the Kosovo Government   
As mentioned above, the Kosovo government has made significant efforts to 
counter violent Islamic extremism both within and outside of Kosovo. However, many 
problems exist in the Kosovo government that impede its efforts in combating Islamic 
terrorism. While all countries have challenges in combating terrorism, Kosovo, as a new 
sovereign country, must deal with challenges in counterterrorism that are compounded by 
existing issues with rebuilding the country from the aftermaths of the 1990s conflicts. Of 
the utmost importance among these challenges are law enforcement, border control, and 
other tools that would normally be of assistance in preventing or minimizing violent 
Islamic terrorism. 
In addition, Kosovo’s unfamiliarity with various terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq 
has been a challenge for the judiciary authorities of Kosovo, which could lead to legal 
issues such as having to release terrorist for lack of evidence. Two reporters from 
BalkanInsight covered the trials of Kosovar Islamic foreign fighters and reported that the 
presiding Kosovo judges were unable to distinguish between various terrorist groups 
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operating in the conflict areas of Syria and Iraq.
154
 Such a flawed justice system naturally 
would result in significant difficulties in properly prosecuting terrorist suspects. KCSS 
report says, “policy and decision makers as well as the general public do not make clear 
distinctions between religionization efforts by religious authorities (i.e. Imams) and 
violent extremist efforts (other imams and extremist activities).”155 In addition to legal 
issues, the inability to distinguish between citizens practicing their religion of choice and 
violent extremists could further cripple counterterrorism efforts by creating hatred and 
discontent within Kosovo. 
Another problem area in Kosovo’s counterterrorism initiatives is the regional 
cooperation among Islamic extremists in the Balkans region. A recent UNDP assessment 
reported, “the complete rupture in police cooperation between Kosovo and neighboring 
states that do not recognize it—Serbia and Bosnia—hampers counter-terrorism.”156 There 
are countries in the Balkans that have high violent Islamic extremist numbers than 
Kosovo, i.e., Bosnia, Macedonia, and Albania. In fact, there is ample evidence indicating 
that the violent Islamic extremist groups within the Balkans are all interconnected and 
likely operate under the same leadership of the Islamic State.  
The conversion of a small minority in the Balkans who embrace the new violent 
Islamic ideology referred to as “takfir,” which is motivated by the Islamic State, is a 
result of the activities by imams from Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia, who were 
educated in the Middle East. In fact, KCSS reported that “this ideology has found its 
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place in Kosovo through a number of Skopje (Macedonia) based Imams who have visited 
and studied in the Middle East, becoming prey to Takfir circles in its most prominent 
ideological base-Egypt.”157  
The Soufan Group recently estimated that “least 875 fighters have traveled to 
Syria from the Balkans, with fighters coming from at least seven different countries in the 
region. Almost 800 of these fighters come from just four countries—Albania, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia—all located in the western Balkans.”158 Additionally, the 
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) estimates that approximately 500 ethnic Albanians 
from the Western Balkans have traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012.
159
 In the summer of 
2015, all Western Balkan countries increased their security levels in an effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks by the Islamic State. The threat became escalated when the Islamic 
State’s black flag was reported to be spotted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not far from 
Kosovo.
160
  
As the violent Islamic extremists in the Balkans are interconnected, it is of vital 
importance that Kosovo is a part of regional cooperation with other Balkan countries, 
implementing measures such as intelligence sharing and other joint efforts to combat the 
violent Islamic phenomenon. In light of a recent Soufan Group report indicating that “it 
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would appear that the number of fighters from the Balkans has at least doubled, if not 
tripled, since June 2014,”161 regional cooperation is more important now than ever. 
 
International Dimensions of Kosovo’s Challenges in Dealing with Violent Islamic 
Extremism 
As the above analysis made clear, Kosovo faces numerous internal challenges that 
have led and contributed to the current issue of violent Islamic extremism. However, 
neither Kosovo nor the rest of the Balkans would be facing such substantial security 
threat without the influence of certain Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. These countries 
advocate and teach a version of Islam that has led to the violent Islamic extremism as we 
know it today, and they began to heavily influence the Balkans after the fall of 
communism during their investment ventures in the region. 
In the aftermath of the conflict of the 1990s, Kosovars were left with a 
tremendous scarcity of various types of resources, and in the face of extreme 
socioeconomic challenges, they might have gravitated to any number of illegal activities 
in hopes of a better future. However, were it not for these Arab countries and their 
Islamic ideologies, it is highly unlikely that Kosovo and the rest of the region would have 
been dealing with their citizens participating in violent Islamic extremism.  
This part of the paper explains how this form of Islam was introduced in the 
Balkans by those few Arab states, and how this influence has had a profound impact on 
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the terrorism issues that are the topic of discussion in this thesis. While the people of the 
Balkans historically fought for a national cause that united the people, the spread of Saudi 
Arabia’s Wahhabism has shifted the motivation for Kosovar fighters and caused a wide 
divide in Kosovo.  
Furthermore, what has occurred in Kosovo after these countries established their 
presence in the region is also very telling when analyzing the global rise of violent 
Islamic extremism. This significantly problematic component of this issue goes beyond 
Kosovo and deserves much more attention. Kosovo is a very small country and with the 
proper measures in place, violent Islamic can be overcome.  
Chapter One of this paper discussed Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi ideology and the 
role it played in the rise of global violent Islamic extremism. As such, the history and 
nature of the ideology will not be reiterated. Suffice it to say that it was precisely this 
ideology that was emphasized during lectures on Islam offered in Kosovo mosques by 
Saudi-educated clerics. The lectures, advocating Wahhabism, preached the same religious 
hatred propagated at home in Saudi Arabia.  
According to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2012 
Annual Report, Saudi school books of the 2010–2011 school year, a list of which was 
posted on the Saudi Ministry of Education’s website, “continue to teach hatred toward 
other religions and, in some cases, promote violence.”162 More specifically, those 
textbooks “justified violence against apostates and homosexuals and labeled Jews and 
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Christians enemies of the believers.”163 This is not any different from what is seen in the 
Islamic State’s ideology.  
The religious landscape in Kosovo began to shift when countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey began to invest in Kosovo as part of their humanitarian relief efforts 
after the war in 1999. As these states overreached for the Balkans Muslims, their 
investment or relief activities in Kosovo became an avenue for the propagation of 
extremist Islamic views in a region that has largely been secular. 
Kosovo is a perfect case study to understand the relentless efforts of Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and several other Islamic and Arab countries to impose their religious views, 
principles, and political goals on socioeconomically weak and vulnerable countries such 
as Kosovo. David Garner from the Columnist wrote, “Since the end of the cold war and 
after the wars of the Yugoslav succession, the western Balkans—in particular Albania, 
Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia and even bits of Bulgaria—have been carpeted with Saudi-
financed Wahhabi mosques and madrassas.”164 Madrassa refers to Muslim schools that 
are associated with mosques. Carol Chosky and Jamsheed Choksy also report that “Saudi 
Arabia is not the only source of resources for Jihadism-public and private entities in 
Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and more recently Turkey have also been linked 
to collection and transfer of funds supporting terror groups.”165  
In 2012, before the issue of violent Islamic fighters from Kosovo was in the 
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public consciousness, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) published an 
article addressing the rise of a new form of Islam in Kosovo, “stricter forms of the faith 
had taken root after the war, following the influx of Islamic aid agencies and schooling of 
local clerics in Arab countries.”166 Furthermore, the article said, “Kosovo officials said 
they believed as many as 50,000 people in the territory had begun following more 
conservative form of Islam.”167 
After the establishment of Islamic aid agencies and schools for clerics came the 
excessive number of mosques that were erected in Kosovo. In 2012, BIRN reported that 
the Islamic Community of Kosovo has been involved in reconstructing and building a 
very large number of mosques. Approximately 113 mosques were reconstructed and 
about 155 new ones were built “through various funding channels.”168  
More mosques have been built than schools in Kosovo since 1999. Where did the 
funding for such constructions come from? It is highly unlikely that the funding for 
Islamic Community of Kosovo construction projects came from the Kosovo government. 
In fact, David Phillips from the Huffington Post wrote, “the Muslim Society of Kosovo is 
well-financed by Turkey and the Gulf States, with an annual budget of 6 million euros. 
Imams pay stipends to parents, targeting single mothers, so their children adhere to 
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Muslim traditions—hadith.”169 Furthermore, Phillips said, “capitalizing on Kosovo’s 
weak education system, religious charities from Arabic countries have established a 
strong presence in Kosovo, offering English and computer lessons—along with 
instruction in the Qur’an.”170 Ida Orzechowska from Global Research echoed, “It’s 
becoming common practice to pay people in their initial phase of religiosity for regular 
visit to the mosque, wearing a hijab or a beard.”171 
A significant contributing factor of the violent Islamic extremism in Kosovo is the 
influence, either directly or otherwise, of the Islamic Community of Kosovo and its 
imams, who were funded and educated in various Islamic and Gulf countries. As 
mentioned previously in this chapter, many Kosovo imams have been charged with 
terrorism-related activities, such as spreading hatred and encouraging and recruiting 
Kosovar citizens to fight alongside the Islamic State in Syria or Iraq.
172
 
Indeed, the Islamic Community of Kosovo has been accused of being the key 
“middle-man” for spreading and supporting Wahhabism. According to Avni Islami, a 
Muslim scholar, the wider Kosovo Islamic community is not doing its job to “duly 
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manage” mosques, because 99 percent of the Kosovar participants in the Syrian 
conflict—both the recruiters and the recruited—came out of these mosques.173 
Areas especially vulnerable to these extremist influences are the largely ignored 
rural areas of Kosovo, where there is hardly any presence of the Kosovo government or 
the international community. These areas are overwhelmingly poor, with even lower 
educational standards, which provide easier access for the Islamic and Gulf countries to 
penetrate and spread their ideologies in those communities in the guise of charities or 
investment ventures.
174
 The KCSS report stated, “poorly educated men and women in 
rural communities, consequently, accepted some of the conditions of Saudi charity 
organizations to attend their lectures that introduced them to more conservative and rigid 
thoughts of Islam.”175 
The Gulf countries certainly wanted to give an impression that their presence in 
Kosovo was strictly for humanitarian efforts. In addition to providing a significant 
amount of funds for the Islamic Community of Kosovo and other Islamic institutions, the 
Gulf countries also provided funding for hospitals and other humanitarian projects. 
However, these countries’ true motives were revealed when the Saudi Joint Relief 
Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC) was reported to have links to al-Qaeda. 
Most of Saudi funds flowing into Kosovo were operated through this organization. The 
                                                 
173
 Ervin Qafmolla, “Kosovo Islamic Body Accused of Tolerating Extremists,” Balkan 
Insight, October 29, 2015, accessed January 10, 2016, 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-islamic-body-accused-of-tolerating-
extremists-10-28-2015.  
174
 Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development “Political Islam Among the 
Albanians: Are the Taliban Coming to the Balkans?” Policy Research Series, June 2005, 
accessed January 10, 2016, 
http://www.kipred.org/repository/docs/Political_Islam_Among_the_Albanians-
_Are_the_Taliban_coming_to_the_Balkans_137060.pdf  
175
 Shpend Kursani, “Kosovar Center for Security Studies,” 59.  
 67 
BBC reported, “the relief committee works as an umbrella body for several Saudi NGOs, 
including the Saudi Red Crescent and has a multi million-dollar budget partly financed 
by the Saudi government.”176 This fact provides some explanation for the link between 
Saudi Arabia and the terrorist groups operating within Kosovo and the Balkans region.  
Other facts later surfaced that made it clear that Saudi Arabia’s involvement in 
terrorist activities, in the Balkans and beyond, is anything but coincidental. Immediately 
following the crowning of the new King of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, in January 2015, 
reports began circulating about his illicit dealings and support to the Mujahedeen, al-
Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations. According to a UN-sponsored investigation, in 
the 1990s “Salman transferred more than $120 million from commission accounts under 
his control, as well as from his own personal accounts, to the Third World Relief Agency, 
another al-Qaeda front and the main pipeline for illegal weapons shipments to al-Qaida 
fighters in the Balkans.”177  
Furthermore, the illegal operations of the Saudi High Commission for Relief of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SHC), founded in 1992 and overseen by King Salman, were 
exposed for ongoing in elicit illegality. According to David Weinberg, an expert on Saudi 
Arabia wrote, “In 2011, NATO forces raided the SHC’s Sarajevo offices and discovered 
a treasure trove of terrorist materials: before and after photographs of al-Qaeda attacks, 
instructions for how to fake U.S. State Department badges, and maps marked to highlight 
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government buildings across Washington, D.C.,” among other items.178 There is no lack 
of evidence supporting King Salman’s ties to terrorist organizations. 
What does Saudi Arabia want? More broadly, what is the goal of countries and 
groups subscribing to Wahhabism, such as the Islamic State? According to Tim Lister, a 
Middle East expert, the Islamic State wants to achieve a global caliphate, remain and 
expand its hold over Iraq and Syria, smash borders, purify Islam, and enslave the 
disbelievers.
179
 In the summer of 2015, the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, released a video calling on all his supporters to wage jihad, whether by 
traveling to Syria and Iraq or fight in their respective lands. He urged, “Do not think that 
the war we are waging is the Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it is the Muslim’s war 
altogether. It is the duty of every Muslim in every place, and the Islamic State is merely 
the spearhead in this war. It is but war of the people of faith against the people of 
disbelief.”180  
These four goals of the Islamic State are in line with Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism 
or political goal, or perhaps both. King Salman, before being crowned the sovereign, has 
been associated with at least three organizations that have been under international 
investigations: “the International Islamic Relief Organization, al-Haramain Foundation, 
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and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.”181 The involvement of Saudi Arabia in 
global terrorism cannot be underestimated, and it is crucial that Kosovo officials know 
who the players are behind the force of terrorism that is now a threat to Kosovo’s national 
security. 
 
Islamic State’s Recruitment Efforts  
The Islamic State has had substantial success in its recruitment efforts. One of its 
strongest tools has been the internet, which had never been used to this extent by another 
terrorist organization. Brendan I. Koerner, an editor for Wired says, “the Islamic State 
recognized the power of digital media early on, when its brutish progenitor, Jordanian 
Jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, discovered the utility of uploading grainy videos of his 
atrocities to the internet.”182 
With the internet, the Islamic State’s propaganda has reached almost every part of 
the world, including people in vulnerable socioeconomic positions. Kosovo’s lack of 
resources, poverty and high unemployment rates have not prevented Kosovars from 
having internet access. In fact, Kosovo’s “internet penetration rate and the number of 
internet users are among the highest in the region, and are comparable to many EU 
member states.”183 Even the vast majority of residents in rural Kosovo have internet 
access. The propaganda proved particularly effective in rural areas of Kosovo, where 
most of the Kosovar foreign fighters come from.   
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Two significant factors made internet access an efficient channel for the Islamic 
State’s propaganda videos in rural Kosovo. First, the lack of foreign language skills limits 
the Kosovar youth to only Albanian language content.
184
 This means the youth in rural 
Kosovo may be more likely to be exposed to Kosovo imams’ teachings than other 
internet resources available in Albanian. Second, much of the web content available in 
Albanian concerns Islamic teachings, with countless lectures delivered by Kosovar 
imams, who discuss and offer “some very basic questions on existential issues.”185 The 
two factors combined resulted in the rural youth of Kosovo being exposed to more 
Islamic teaching than other content on the internet.  
According to “Documenting the Virtual Caliphate,” an October 2015 report by the 
Quilliam Foundation, the Islamic State “releases on average thirty-eight new items per 
day—twenty-minute videos, full-length documentaries, photo essays, audio clips, and 
pamphlets, in languages ranging from Russian to Bengali.”186 However, as part of Islamic 
State’s online propaganda  “are portrayals of public works projects, economic 
development, and military triumphs, frequently aimed at specific Muslim enclaves 
throughout the world.”187 In so doing, the Islamic State has achieved massive success 
through its online propaganda.   
A recent report from the Council on Foreign Relations says that the Islamic State 
is more a “boots on the ground” than a “bytes on the net” problem, refuting claims that 
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the group’s online propaganda has strategic value.188 However, this report is inaccurate, 
as it underestimates the significant role the online propaganda has played in the group’s 
global recruitment success, including in Kosovo and the Balkans. As noted Middle East 
expert Hisham Melhem said, “the technologies of globalization offer contemporary 
radical extremist opportunities to reach mass audiences to an extent their predecessors 
could never have imagined, and the Islamic State has exploited these technologies more 
successfully than any of its contemporaries in the Islamist world.”189 
In Summary, this chapter discussed Kosovo’s challenge in confronting violent 
Islamic extremism by highlighting the effect of the war of the 1990s and the 
interconnectedness of fighters in other Balkan states. The chapter also presented the 
actions that the government of Kosovo has taken to address violent Islamic extremism, as 
well as the factors that hamper its efforts. The analysis then turned to a survey of the 
international dimensions of violent Islamic extremism, such as the presence and influence 
of certain Islamic and Arab countries that contributed significantly to the surge of Islamic 
foreign fighters from Kosovo, as well as the Islamic State’s use of the internet, which 
transcends country borders and penetrates even to the remotest areas of Kosovo.  
Chapter Four will turn to an analysis of the religious and socioeconomic 
components of Kosovo’s response to violent Islamic extremism. It will then conclude 
with recommendations, summary, and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELIGIOUS AND SOCIOECONOMIC COMPONENTS OF KOSOVO’S 
RESPONSE TO RADICAL ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
 
This final chapter focuses on two significant components—religious and 
socioeconomic—Kosovo must consider in its response to radical Islamic extremism. 
Addressing one without the other will likely lead to ineffective counterterrorism efforts. 
This chapter will demonstrate that while Kosovo’s socioeconomic situation in the 
aftermath of the 1990s conflicts has left its citizens with few opportunities for 
advancement, and therefore many turn to radical Islamic groups to escape poverty, the 
fundamental shifts in Kosovo’s cultural and religious landscape in the last few decades 
have also contributed to the appeal of radical extremism to young Kosovars. As such, 
Kosovo must develop solutions to both the socioeconomic and the religious problems in 
order to successfully stem the waves of fighters from leaving its borders to join extremist 
groups. While both socioeconomic and religious problems are significant, it is more 
likely that the Kosovo government will be able to more effectively address the latter in 
the near future.  
 
Religious Components of the Kosovo Challenge 
As discussed in previous chapters, prior to 1999 Islam was not a critical or even a 
relevant part of Kosovars’ life, and this remains true to the present day for the vast 
majority of the population. Although the majority of the Kosovar population has a 
Muslim background, which was introduced in the Balkans during the Ottoman reign 
between 1389-1912. Kosovo then became part of Yugoslavia, which was not necessarily 
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a communist regime until 1945, it was more nationalistic with roots in communist 
ideology. Then, during the communist rule between 1945-1990s most stopped practicing 
religion, including Islam. The fall of communism created ideological confusion 
throughout the Balkans region, including Kosovo, which was exacerbated by the ethnic 
clashes that ensued in the following years.  
In the early 2000s, a noticeable shift in ideology began—not only toward religion, 
but also radical Islamic extremism, among a small minority of the population. The 
beginning of this shift coincided with the time when a significant number of charities, 
funded by certain Islamic and Arab states, began to establish their presence in Kosovo as 
they brought in much-needed financial assistance for the redevelopment of Kosovo. 
Much of these charities’ focus was on building mosques, awarding scholarships for 
Kosovar imams to study in the Middle East, and developing other religious projects, 
especially the Islamic Community of Kosovo.  
The Islamic Community of Kosovo is a very well-funded entity by those Islamic 
charities mentioned above, especially Saudi-based charities. The presence of these 
Islamic charities and the Islamic Community of Kosovo is not the ultimate cause of the 
religious challenge in Kosovo’s counterterrorism efforts—it is the infiltration of radical 
Islamic extremist ideologies into the Kosovo society through these entities. A previously 
secular society, Kosovo was now exposed to a significant amount of Wahhabism, an 
ultraconservative form of Islam, which is forcefully enforced in Saudi Arabia and 
practiced by the vast majority of violent Islamic extremists.  
The association between the threat of violent Islamic extremism to Kosovo and 
the influence of these Islamic entities is not speculative. As discussed in previous 
 74 
chapters, a majority of those Kosovars charged with terrorism-related offenses were part 
of the same mosques that fall under the jurisdiction of the Islamic Community of Kosovo. 
Through the Islamic Community of Kosovo and other similar organizations, Wahhabi 
Islam penetrated the vulnerable population of Kosovo, including those in dire 
socioeconomic conditions in the rural areas.  
Rural Kosovo has been largely neglected by the Kosovo government and the 
international community, which are spread thin as they try to rebuild the country after the 
1990s conflicts left it in ruins. The vacuum left by the Kosovo government and other 
organizations was filled by the Islamic Community of Kosovo, which reached out to 
those areas with various forms of assistance, including spiritual guidance for those 
struggling with profound existential and socioeconomic difficulties. Its presence naturally 
made a favorable impression on the people in the rural areas, who are mostly young, 
uneducated, with no opportunities. They saw Islam as their ticket to a brighter future, 
financially and spiritually. Given the foregoing, it is clear that the religious appeal of 
radical Islam is a crucial consideration in how Kosovo should respond to its threat. 
Resolving this issue will require tremendous effort and collaboration with international 
organizations. 
Another aspect of the religious component in the Kosovo’s counterterrorism 
challenges is the frequent confusion between extremists and peaceful Muslims. As 
previously mentioned, Kosovars are predominantly secular and among the religious there 
are many different faiths. Thus, although some Kosovars have joined extremist Islamic 
groups, the average secular Kosovar is unable to distinguish between a conservative 
Muslim and a radical Islamic extremist. This confusion between the two types of Islam 
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followers has created tension between nonreligious and religious citizens of Kosovo, 
even among the peaceful Muslims. 
The lack of understanding of the differences between the two groups has resulted 
in a general disapproval of the entire Islamic community among most Kosovars, 
including Kosovo’s policy-makers. As the rift deepens among the Kosovo population, 
Muslims who feel unaccepted—or, worse, threatened or disrespected—by their neighbors 
become more likely to carry out attacks on their own homeland. People that formerly 
united for a national cause is beginning to be divided by this new form of religion. A 
fragmented society, as Kosovo could become if the distrust and misunderstanding of 
Muslims is not corrected, would encounter significant troubles in becoming a free, 
democratic, and prosperous country.  
 
Socioeconomic Components of the Kosovo Challenge, Visa Restrictions and Lack of 
Proper Education  
In addition to the religious components in Kosovo’s counterterrorism challenges, 
there are socioeconomic factors that also contribute to the picture. The lack of a strong 
education, visa restrictions, and lack of opportunities in Kosovo will remain the core of 
most problems. It has been eight years since Kosovo declared its independence, which 
has been recognized by more than 100 countries, but Kosovo remains one of the poorest 
countries in Europe.  
Kosovo citizens are rather isolated, as they are prohibited from traveling to most 
countries. The only countries they can travel to are the problematic Islamic ones that have 
been discussed throughout this thesis. Certainly, given the opportunity, Kosovo citizens 
 76 
would much rather travel to the U.S. than Saudi Arabia, Germany than Egypt, but 
unfortunately, that is not a reality for the average Kosovo citizen.   
 It is not financially feasible for the vast majority of Kosovo students to attend one 
of the only public universities, which is located in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Besides 
limited access to postsecondary education, the general educational system in Kosovo is 
below the standards of any European country. Graduating from the University of Pristina 
does not guarantee the average student a brighter future. In fact, with the high 
unemployment rate, a university diploma doesn’t offer most people any sort of future. 
Besides, the universities do not have the ability to properly prepare students for today’s 
workforce. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The socioeconomic challenges impeding Kosovo’s successful response to violent 
Islamic extremism include extremely high unemployment rate, weak educational system, 
high corruption, lack of the rule of law, lack of opportunities, and visa restrictions that 
limit Kosovo citizens to obtain employment in only a few Eastern countries. The 
socioeconomic conditions in Kosovo are deeply problematic and have contributed 
significantly to the issue at hand. However, this thesis recognizes that these 
socioeconomic conditions are unlikely to change in the near future and therefore the 
recommendations will focus on more realistic approaches.  
Given the urgency and severity of the national security threats, Kosovo must take 
assertive steps to counter violent Islamic extremism, while being tactful and considerate 
to avoid creating a hateful and biased perception of Islam among the Kosovo population. 
In Kosovo’s counterterrorism efforts, it is critical to preserve the human rights and 
religious freedom of all people involved, in accordance with international law. 
Depravation of religious freedom will only lead to further tension between the Islamic 
Community of Kosovo and the Kosovo citizens.  
The first and most critical component of countering the global phenomenon of 
Islamic extremism is the close cooperation between all institutions operating within 
Kosovo, including sharing of information across the board among citizens, all 
government entities, and the Islamic Community of Kosovo. The information sharing 
will also allow the government and international agencies in Kosovo to better understand 
and address the gaps in social services that have been exploited by extremists. Terrorist 
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organizations are successful because they offer services that the government fails to 
provide for the citizens, including social services, security, healthcare, etc. The Kosovo 
government, NGOs, and other organizations in Kosovo need to step in and fill these gaps. 
Realistically, the political, socioeconomic, and security environment in Kosovo is 
unlikely to change drastically in the near future; therefore collective efforts are required. 
An important part of this collaboration is the appropriate allocation of funds to counter 
violent extremism.  
All efforts, including those of various international agencies, must be organized 
by one central agency that oversees all operations. Without effective coordination and 
centralized oversight by an official agency, whose primary goal is to combat violent 
Islamic extremism, many good initiatives would be carried out in vain.  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, one of most significant threats within Kosovo’s 
borders is the illicit operations of the Islamic and Arab states fronted by charity activities. 
Recognizing that Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in the world and is in dire need 
of monetary assistance, this thesis recommends that government authorities not only 
monitor all foreign aid, but also ultimately determine its allocation.  
Further, again recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, this thesis recommends that 
government officials carefully consider which foreign aid activities are actually necessary 
for the development of Kosovo. Building hundreds of mosques and Islamic schools, 
rather than regular schools, should not be considered a priority because it does not 
contribute to the overall development of Kosovo. In fact, as prior analysis demonstrated, 
radicalization and violent Islamic extremism in Kosovo can be partially attributed to the 
extremely well-funded Islamic Community of Kosovo. The best way to prevent foreign 
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investments from being used for terrorism activities and financing is close monitoring 
and partnering with these countries to ensure complete transparency of funds allocated.  
The strategies to counter global violent Islamic extremism have already been well 
established by some of the most brilliant minds and the most powerful countries in the 
world. These are not one-size-fits-all suggestions, however. For example, violent Islamic 
extremism threatens the United States, the UK, and France in very different ways from 
how it threatens Kosovo or the Balkans. To successfully apply them in Kosovo, the 
government should tailor the strategies according to its unique situations. However, the 
key in applying those strategies and tools requires that they are tailored to each individual 
country and region.  
 Developing counterterrorism strategies specific to Kosovo may be easier than it 
sounds. Although Kosovo does not have the training, expertise, or the financial capability 
to counter violent Islamic extremism on the same level as the U.S. can, Kosovo does have 
an enormous advantage with the significant international support and presence within its 
borders. This is an advantage that most countries similar to Kosovo simply do not have, 
so it must be leveraged to its full extent.  
In collaboration with the international community, it is critical that the Kosovo 
government has the lead in all efforts related to violent Islamic extremism within its 
borders. This entails the Kosovo government having complete oversight of all operations 
within and outside of Kosovo related to Kosovo’s counterterrorism initiatives. No other 
entity should have jurisdictional authority for matters related to Kosovo’s national 
security, unless it is fully transparent and authorized by Kosovo government officials. 
Providing higher domestic security in Kosovo can be achieved by establishing an 
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antiterrorism force of well-trained and equipped personnel to conduct counterterrorism 
operations in all vulnerable areas, such as airports, borders, and mosques. Additionally, 
such force can provide more close monitoring of vulnerable municipalities such as 
Gjilan, Ferizaj, Kacanik, and Mitrovica. The Kosovo government can evaluate this 
recommendation against the available funds and resources for its law enforcement and 
weigh how to allocate its resources. 
While recognizing the delicacy of this issue, this thesis submits that national 
security must hold priority. This thesis recommends that the special antiterrorism force be 
authorized to conduct security checks of all mosques within Kosovo. 
Kosovo must aggressively seek closer regional cooperation with all its 
neighboring countries. Disengagement is not an option, as the extremists in the Balkans 
are interconnected and work in concert to threaten the stability and security of the entire 
region. A robust communication and tracking system must be put in place to allow 
sharing of available information among all authorities across the board, including local 
and regional agencies, academic institutions, private organizations, NGOs, etc.  
The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism in Kosovo should not be 
underestimated. The reality of the danger was made evident in the summer of 2015 when 
a few individuals attempted to poison the main water supply of Pristina. Those 
individuals were Islamic foreign fighters returning home from Syria and Iraq. Although 
there have not been any terrorist attacks in Kosovo, videos have been released by the 
Islamic State and Kosovar foreign fighters, warning Kosovo and the Balkans of their 
upcoming plans of attacks. Furthermore, the Kosovar foreign fighter returnees pose a 
significant threat, especially the ones who have traveled freely to Syria and back through 
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Turkey. They are extremely difficult to track but are very dangerous; therefore, travelers 
from and to Turkey should be closely monitored. 
Community outreach and community policing would be an extremely useful tool. 
This program should be aimed at every municipality and region of Kosovo, especially the 
problematic areas where a larger number of Islamic foreign fighters come from. Not only 
would this strategy bring awareness to the average citizen who is not aware of the 
dangers posed in Kosovo by radicalization and violent Islamic extremism, it would also 
encourage national involvement for a great cause. This would especially be extremely 
effective in rural areas. This would be a low-cost project with substantial benefits, 
especially if it is volunteer-based and encouraged by local schools to participate in return 
for extra credit or some other academic benefit.  
Another possibility is implementing a similar campaign as the one designed by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: “If You See Something, Say Something.”190 
A similar campaign in Kosovo would likely bring enormous success by cultivating 
awareness and encouraging citizens to report suspicious activities. Communities have 
always played a powerful role in every society.  
Kosovo’s educational system must place emphasis on its youth by providing 
better quality education, better access to education, and extracurricular activities for all 
school-aged children. These efforts would counter those of mosques that have been 
spreading radical and violent views.  
The government can educate and communicate to the citizens of Kosovo about 
counterterrorism on TV channels, radio stations, internet, local communities, and at 
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schools. Kosovo’s high rate of internet accessibility has been exploited by the extremists 
for propagating dangerous messages, but the government can tap into this resource  for 
counter messaging. Counter messaging programs would likely have positive outcomes. 
According to Charles Lister, “discerning exactly who has left the country will 
determine the extent to which domestic border control should be capable of detecting 
their return and assessing the threat posed.”191 This would be an easy task for the 
government of Kosovo to achieve if the family members are empowered to report either 
early signs or any other activity about their Islamic foreign fighter family. Empowering 
women is an extremely useful to achieve this goal as well, according to Lister.  
In order to successfully combat global terrorism, all aspects and links should be 
researched and studied extensively. Saudi Arabia’s direct involvement in Kosovo and the 
Balkans is only a part of the problem, but a significant one that is worth exploring.  
Moreover, it may be fruitful to analyze Saudi Arabia’s and other Islamic countries’ 
tactics and deceptive agendas for infiltrating radical Islam into countries such as Kosovo 
where there is a significant international presence.   
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SUMMARY 
 
 Today, terrorist attacks by violent Islamic extremist are extremely frequent 
globally and have become part of everyday life. As national security has become a 
critical concern for many countries in the world, this thesis is written at a timely juncture 
to provide further insight into the successful recruitment of violent Islamic groups by 
identifying some of the root causes. The thesis approached this analysis by focusing on 
Kosovo as a case study. The selection of Kosovo as the target case study is important and 
relevant. While Kosovo is a relatively small country in comparison to many other 
countries, it has disproportionately contributed Islamic foreign fighters—the highest 
number per capita of foreign fighters—to the Islamic State and other terrorist 
organizations. In a small and historically secular country, violent Islamic extremists have 
gained tremendous success in Islamizing and radicalizing a segment of Kosovo’s 
population. As such, understanding the radicalization of Kosovo will offer insight into 
how Islamic terrorism has gained such traction globally. The thesis sought to delineate 
the strategies that were used by powerful Arab states in the last two decades that led to 
the current surge of Islamic fighters leaving Kosovo for the Middle East.  
As emphasized in previous chapters, before one can begin to find a solution to 
any problem, it is important to first examine and understand the origin of the problem, 
which is precisely the aim of this thesis. As such, before examining the rhetoric of 
present-day Islamic State or offering recommendations for countering its recruitment 
efforts, the thesis first provided a thorough analysis of the rise of global violent Islamic 
extremism, examining both the Islam religion itself and the background and current 
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conditions of those who became Islamic foreign fighters. Within this discussion, it was 
inevitable to trace the impact of Wahhabism and the Sunni–Shia power struggles 
historically and presently, mainly between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This paper made 
evident that the Sunni–Shia component of this issue is one of the main causes of the 
global rise of Islamic extremism. The overwhelming instabilities across the Middle East 
can be attributed to the political power struggles between powerful Islamic countries that 
adhere to different strands of Islam. More specifically, the conflict in Syria, which has 
motivated many of the Kosovar fighters, is a result of the Sunni–Shia divide.  
In Syria, the Sunni majority have been opposing its Shia leadership, i.e., President 
Assad. The Islamic State, arguably a Sunni movement and likely funded by Saudi Arabia, 
is fighting Syria’s Shia government, which is a reflection of Saudi Arabia’s domestic and 
foreign policy. Additionally, this thesis recognizes the negative impact of some of the 
United States’ involvement in Middle East. Overthrowing various governments and 
occupying land in order to protect U.S. strategic interests has not proven to be a 
successful foreign policy; in fact, these policies have certainly contributed to the rise of 
global Islamic extremism.  
The next important component that this thesis examined was the emergence of 
Kosovo as a recruitment ground for Islamic extremism. By presenting a picture of 
Kosovo’s past and present, including descriptions of the Kosovo people’s origin and 
religious affiliations historically, the backdrop of the thesis was developed, without 
which any discussion of today’s Islamic radicalization would be erroneous and 
incomplete at best. Importantly in this presentation is Kosovo’s bloody past and the 
challenges Kosovo has faced since the 1990s that left the country completely devastated. 
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These events resulted in a weak economy in which young Kosovars have few options for 
finding gainful employment besides become willing fighters for the Islamic State and 
other terrorist groups. Although Kosovo, with the help of Western countries, declared its 
independence from Serbia in 2008, it has not yet recovered from the conflicts of the 
1990s. While it has been recognized by over 100 countries, Kosovo is strongly opposed 
by Russia and China due to their political relationship with Serbia. Opposition by Russia 
and China blocks Kosovo’s UN membership and limits further international funding and 
support for counterterrorism and internal development. Kosovo remains one of the 
poorest countries in Europe and almost completely isolated because of visa restrictions 
imposed by the vast majority of countries, including the ones who recognize Kosovo as a 
sovereign state.  
Having the historical and socioeconomic background of Kosovo in mind, it 
becomes clear how the Islamic State has exploited Kosovo’s weak governance, lack of 
rule of law, high corruption, low education, and high unemployment rates. The Islamic 
State’s recruitment strategies of foreign fighters have been recognized to be the most 
successful of its kind. What makes Kosovo unique in the Islamic State’s successful 
recruitment is that prior to 1999, Kosovo was not associated with any Islamic 
organizations. It was not until Arab countries established their presence in the Balkans in 
the 1990s that the conservative religious shift began among a small minority of Kosovars. 
Prior to this time, throughout history Kosovo had been mainly a secular state, though 
with a Muslim background, during and after the communist era. While the Kosovo 
government established itself as a secular state, some of its citizens embraced the 
religious freedom and turned to Islam following the influx of Arab charity organizations. 
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One factor that has motivated Kosovars to join Islam is that exceptionally high corruption 
rates within the Kosovo government led the people to have less trust in governmental 
institutions than in the Islamic Community of Kosovo. The Islamic Community, which is 
heavily funded and supported by Arab states, has certainly made efforts to attract 
publicity in providing humanitarian aid, especially in the rural areas of Kosovo where 
poverty is rampant.  
Kosovo has increased its efforts to combat violent Islamic extremism in the last 
few years and has seen some successful results. Among its counterterrorist initiatives, 
Kosovo has developed a national strategy and new anti-terrorism laws, and have made 
numerous arrests related to terrorist activities, including imams who recruited and 
preached violent extremism. This thesis pointed out that in Kosovo’s fight against 
terrorism, it must address limitations and challenges associated with both terrorism and 
overall development of the country.  
 
Conclusion  
On the issue of violent Islamic extremism on the global scale, Kosovo is a unique 
and complex case study in both the form of extremism it faces and the responses that are 
required to combat the radicalization of the country. This thesis makes clear that Kosovo 
has an extremely challenging task ahead to rid the country of the threat of violent Islamic 
extremism, which promises to crumble the stability of Kosovo and its neighboring 
countries.  
This thesis has presented the historical events in Kosovo that led up to its present-
day socioeconomic and religious landscape and analyzed various factors that contributed 
 87 
to the foreign fighter phenomenon in Kosovo. The thesis also sought to identify the main 
causes—both religious and otherwise—of Kosovo’s becoming a fertile source for recruits 
by the Islamic State. Finally, in the concluding chapter of this thesis, several 
recommendations are offered for the government of Kosovo’s counterterrorism efforts. 
These recommendations address the socioeconomic issues that have made Islamic 
extremism appealing to young Kosovars, as well as the religious components of the 
phenomenon that must be dealt with to stem the flow of foreign fighters from leaving 
Kosovo for the Middle East.  
The threat of violent Islamic extremism is not in Kosovo alone. The phenomenon 
is a recognized global issue, and if such terrorism is not taken seriously and dealt with 
properly in Kosovo, it could lead to catastrophic consequences in Kosovo and beyond. It 
would threaten the democracy, human rights, security, and stability of Europe and the 
entire world. Specific to Kosovo, however, such terrorism could reverse the international 
and national efforts that went into the restoration of the country’s economy, political 
structure, and social stability.  
 However, identifying the causes and the key players in the terrorist threat can 
help Kosovo and other countries in the region develop effective strategies to combat the 
threat. This thesis has identified some of these causes and key players. With this 
information in its arsenal, now Kosovo must make it a top priority to address radical 
Islamic extremism and work in concert with the international agencies already within its 
borders to implement comprehensive and realistic measures against terrorism. 
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